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PERFORMANCE-SENSITIVE DEBT: 
FROM ASSET-BASED LOANS TO STARTUP 
FINANCING 
Houman B. Shadab* 
This Article develops a unique theory of performance-sensitive debt 
and argues that certain revenue-stage startups may be missing out on an 
important source of capital from asset-based loans. Debt contracts are 
performance sensitive to the extent any of the borrower’s obligations adjust 
in response to the performance of the borrower. The three main types of 
performance sensitivity I identify are (1) a loan’s interest rate adjusting 
based on the performance of the borrower; (2) the amount of available 
credit adjusting based on the value of collateral; and (3) renegotiation 
following breach of a loan covenant. Conceptualizing performance 
sensitivity as a separate governance mechanism allows me to flesh out, and 
in some cases challenge, several distinct bodies of research, including 
incomplete contracting theory and the literature on capital structure. 
The focus of this Article is on the nature of one type of performance-
sensitive debt in particular—asset-based loans. Asset-based loans are 
important because they are the only type of loan that adjusts the amount of 
credit available to a borrower based on the performance of its assets. Due 
to the protections asset-based loans provide to lenders, they are often the 
only type of loan lenders are willing to make to high-risk borrowers. Asset-
based loans are often cheaper than other sources of capital, more borrower-
friendly than other types of debt, and can be structured to meet the needs of 
a wide variety of borrowers. Because of these characteristics, I argue that 
certain revenue-stage startups, including those with intellectual property 
assets, may be better off raising capital with asset-based loans than other 
types of financing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Investments are often followed by regret.  As a result, over time 
investors have developed contract mechanisms that make it possible for 
investment terms to change in their favor in response to bad news.  An 
important aspect of financial contracting is the extent to which it allows for 
the terms of an investment relationship to change in response to the 
performance of the company that raised the funds (the issuer).  The phrase 
performance sensitivity refers to this general characteristic.  Performance 
sensitivity means that as an issuer’s risk increases, the issuer-investor 
relationship adjusts to mitigate (or eliminate) the investor’s corresponding 
increase in risk exposure.1 
This Article develops a unique theory of performance-sensitive debt 
and argues that certain revenue-stage startups with qualifying assets may be 
missing out on an important source of capital from one type of 
performance-sensitive debt in particular; namely, asset-based loans.  A 
long-standing and pervasive economic problem is providing capital to 
young companies,2 and maximizing the use of asset-based loans can help 
address that problem.3 
Financial instruments exist along a spectrum of performance 
sensitivity.  At one extreme is equity, a financial instrument that has no 
performance sensitivity: the terms of a shareholder’s investment do not 
adjust in response to the issuer’s performance.4  Debt, by contrast, has 
 
 1.  As a corollary, performance sensitivity also means that if an issuer’s performance 
increases after the investment, the investor’s exposure to the company increases to reflect 
the newly improved investment. 
 2.  See generally NAT’L SMALL BUS. ASS’N, SMALL BUSINESS ACCESS TO CAPITAL 
SURVEY 1, 6 (2012) (finding based on survey evidence that “nearly half (43 percent) of 
small-business respondents said that, in the last four years, they needed funds and were 
unable to find any willing sources, be it loans, credit cards or investors”); Survey on the 
Access to Finance of SMEs in the Euro Area (European Central Bank, Frankfurt, Ger.), 
Nov. 2013, at 1 (finding that “access to finance” is a primary concern of euro area small and 
medium sized businesses).  But see ALICIA ROBB & JOSEPH FARHAT, KAUFFMAN FOUND., AN 
OVERVIEW OF THE KAUFFMAN FIRM SURVEY, RESULTS FROM 2011 BUSINESS ACTIVITIES  1, 5 
tbl.1 (2013) (finding that in 2011 only 5.9% of new business reported concerns with access 
to or the cost of credit). 
 3.  Other relatively new or developing credit technologies that may also assist new 
business in raising funds are microloans and peer-to-peer (crowdfunded) lending. 
 4.  An indirect, second-order type of performance sensitivity exists when the investor 
has the option of changing the issuer-investor relationship based on the performance of the 
issuer.  When equity does have performance-sensitive features, they are second-order and 
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varying degrees of performance sensitivity.  For debt, performance 
sensitivity means that as a borrower’s performance declines, the loan’s 
interest rate or other aspect of the loan changes to mitigate the lender’s risk.  
One way for debt to be performance sensitive is through the use of a 
“borrowing base” provision that reduces the amount of credit available as 
the borrower’s asset values decline.  A second performance sensitive debt 
feature is a “performance pricing” provision that increases the borrower’s 
interest rate as its creditworthiness decreases.5  Renegotiating (amending) a 
loan prior to maturity is also an important type of performance sensitivity 
because interest rates, principal amount, and other aspects of the loan can 
be altered in favor of the lender to protect against a deteriorating borrower.  
Renegotiation typically takes place after a borrower breaches a loan 
covenant. 
Figure 1 illustrates the performance sensitivity of several broad classes 
of commercial finance instruments along a spectrum:  
 
 
Figure 1 
Least Performance Sensitive                          Most Performance Sensitive 
 
 
 
Far from being an idiosyncratic feature of the financial world, 
performance sensitive relationships are widespread.  For example, 
purchasing stock with borrowed funds (i.e., “on margin”) and derivatives 
transactions are performance sensitive.  They each require debtors to add 
more collateral if their position begins to decrease in market value.  By so 
doing, the risk to the creditor adjusts in response to the risk of the 
 
include, for example, conversion rights that can be exercised in the discretion of the 
shareholder in response to how the company is performing.  Second-order performance 
sensitivity in the debt context include financial (or maintenance) covenants that give the 
lender the right to demand immediate payment of the loan (or other rights) if the borrower 
fails to live up to certain minimum performance tests (such as the ratio of debt to equity). 
 5.  Another type of performance sensitive debt feature that is not the focus of this 
article is a springing lien/collateral release that requires the borrower to post or release 
collateral if their performance (as measured by creditworthiness) decreases. 
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borrower.  Corporate and government bonds, by contrast, are not generally 
performance sensitive.  No matter what happens to a bond issuer, the terms 
of the bond’s underlying agreement do not change.6  Bondholders are also 
too numerous and dispersed to make a bond renegotiation a generally 
worthwhile undertaking. 
In the past two decades, corporate loans have become more 
performance sensitive through performance pricing provisions that adjust 
their interest rates in response to the borrower’s creditworthiness.7  The 
increasing use of performance-sensitive loans is not an isolated 
phenomenon, however.  It is part of a broader, decades-long trend 
throughout credit markets giving lenders added protection against the risks 
they face from borrowers.  The past two decades have seen an explosion in 
the development of transactions and markets that enable lenders to protect 
themselves by selling off their loans or transferring the loans’ credit risk to 
others.  These markets and risk transfer transactions include the secondary 
market for corporate loans,8 securitizations that bundle loans into shell 
entities that issue bonds,9 and over-the-counter derivatives that allow 
parties to transfer the risk of a wide variety of underlying credit 
instruments.10 
In systematically analyzing performance sensitive debt, this Article 
adds to our understanding of creditor governance11 and corporate finance.  I 
argue that performance sensitivity is a type of fundamental creditor 
governance mechanism like monitoring, collateralization, and using 
covenants.  By contrast, performance sensitivity is typically viewed as an 
ad hoc contract feature that protects creditors,12 but not as something 
 
 6.  A notable exception is “step-up” bonds that have interest rates that increase if the 
borrower is downgraded.  Bonds’ general lack of performance sensitivity largely explains 
why their investors are so dependent on bonds markets to be able to adjust their risk 
exposures. 
 7.  See infra Section II.3.i. 
 8.  See generally GLENN YAGO & DONALD MCCARTHY, THE MILIKEN INSTITUTE, THE 
U.S. LEVERAGED LOAN MARKET: A PRIMER (2004) (discussing “the origins and milestones 
of the quiet revolution that has been the growth of the [primary and secondary] syndicated 
loan market . . . one of the most rapidly growing and innovating sections of the U.S. capital 
market in the past 20 years”), http://milkeninstitute.org/pdf/loan_primer_1004.pdf. 
 9.  Houman B. Shadab, Credit Risk Transfer Governance: The Good, The Bad, and 
the Savvy, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1009, 1046-64 (2012) [hereinafter Shadab]. 
 10.  Id. at 1033-46. 
 11.  See generally Charles K. Whitehead, Creditors and Debt Governance, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW (Claire Hill & Brett 
McDonnell, eds. 2011); Greg Nini, David C. Smith & Amir Sufi, Creditor Control Rights, 
Corporate Governance, and Firm Value, 25 Rev. Fin. Stud. 1713 (2012) [hereinafter Nini et 
al.]; Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private 
Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV. 115 (2009) [hereinafter Tung]. 
 12.  See, e.g., Tung, supra note 11, at 147-150 (focusing on the influence of 
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fundamental.  Conceptualizing performance sensitivity as a unique 
governance mechanism allows me to flesh out, and in some cases 
challenge, several distinct bodies of research. 
First, this Article is the first to identify performance-sensitivity as a 
type of contractual completeness.  Based on that insight, I argue that 
incomplete contracting theory suggests that performance-sensitive 
contracts are generally more efficient when agency or transaction costs are 
high.  Second, literature on the economics of loan renegotiation implies that 
performance sensitivity in the form of renegotiation after breach of loan 
covenants is mutually beneficial characteristic or activity, and not one that 
generally benefits only borrowers or lenders.  Finally, by focusing on 
performance sensitivity, this Article contributes to capital structure 
research.  I argue that performance sensitivity is an important tradeoff 
between debt and equity that should be recognized by the tradeoff theory of 
capital structure.  In addition, in contrast to what pecking order theory 
suggests, I argue that, due to the potential constraints that performance-
sensitive debt places on borrowers, greater informational asymmetries do 
not always imply that a firm should prefer equity over debt. 
This Article focuses on asset-based loans — a type of performance-
sensitive debt.  Although asset-based loans are relatively unknown to 
practitioners and have received little attention by academics,13 they are 
important because they are the only type of loan where the amount of credit 
available to the borrower adjusts based on the value of its assets.  In this 
way, asset-based loans are performance sensitive.14  But unlike loans that 
only have a performance pricing feature that adjusts to the performance of 
the borrower at the entity-level (e.g., as measured by credit ratings), asset-
based loans adjust to the performance of the borrower’s assets—their 
ability to generate cash.  Although asset-based loans are a type of secured 
(collateralized) loan,15 secured loans typically do not change in size based 
on asset performance.  Unlike an asset-based lender, a typical secured 
lender looks primarily to the company’s cash flows for repayment, not its 
 
performance sensitive provisions on managerial incentives and decision-making). 
 13.  To date, there is no legal scholarship on asset-based loans and few academic 
finance papers focused on them.  See, e.g., Mark J. Flannery & Xiaohong (Sara) Wang, 
Borrowing Base Revolvers: Liquidity for Risky Firms, (Working Paper, ,2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1741306); Yasin Alan & Vishal Gaur, Operational Investment and 
Capital Structure Under Asset Based Lending, (Johnson School Research Paper Series, 
Working Paper, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1716925. 
 14.  To my knowledge this Article is the first publication to identify asset-based loans 
as a type of performance-sensitive debt in addition to loans with performance pricing 
provisions. 
 15.  HOUMAN B. SHADAB, Hedge Fund Asset-Based Lending, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE 613 (2010). 
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assets. 
Consistent with what creditor governance and corporate finance 
theory suggest, asset-based loans are also important because they are often 
the only type of loan lenders are willing to provide to risky borrowers.16  
Lenders find asset-based loans attractive because the loans have strong 
governance in the form of intense monitoring, collateralization, and 
performance sensitivity.  And due to the protection from these governance 
devices, asset-based lenders are also willing to accept lower interest rates 
and weaker covenants such that risky firms like startups are more likely to 
qualify for the loans.  Given that the availability of startup financing 
promotes job creation,17 this Article’s focus on asset-based loans also has 
important economy—wide implications because my analysis suggests that 
companies are not fully taking advantage of asset-based lending.  Although 
borrowers run the risk of exposing themselves to unique forms of 
opportunism from asset-based lenders, on balance it seems that certain 
startups would be better off raising capital with an asset-based loan rather 
than by selling stock or using some other kind of loan.  The types of 
startups most likely to benefit from asset-based loans are revenue-stage 
startups with qualifying assets that are seeking financing for growth or 
working capital. 
For most of their history, asset-based loans belonged to an obscure 
corner of the loan market and were used mainly by companies viewed as 
being poorly run or in financial distress.  But that all changed in the twenty-
first century.  Asset-based loans began to overcome the stigma of being 
used solely by desperate borrowers and aggressive lenders, and technology 
substantially decreased lenders’ monitoring costs.  In addition, the asset-
based loan market grew due to the incorporation of second lien loans and 
other innovations in deal structures, the growing involvement of hedge 
 
 16.  Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, Small Business Debt Finance, in HANDBOOK 
OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY SURVEY AND INTRODUCTION 313 
(Audretsch  & Acs eds. 2003) [hereinafter Berger & Udell] (“[A]sset-based lending is 
particularly valuable as a lending technology for high-risk, informationally opaque firms 
where the probability of suboptimal closure is higher”); Slee, infra note 146, at 315 
(“Thousands of companies that would otherwise not qualify for traditional bank lending 
receive asset-based loans each year.”); Tracy Eden, Asset-Based Lenders Serve a True Need 
in Today’s Marketplace, Yahoo! Voices, Aug. 20, 2010, available at 
http://voices.yahoo.com/asset-based-lenders-serve-true-todays-marketplace-6615468.html 
[hereinafter Eden] (“Asset-based lending is often temporary, providing much-needed 
working capital during a start-up or transition phase until the company has enough financial 
history or a strong enough balance sheet to become ‘bankable.’”). 
 17.  See generally TIM KANE, KAUFFMAN  FOUND., THE IMPORTANCE OF STARTUPS IN 
JOB CREATION AND JOB DESTRUCTION (2010),  
http://www.kauffman.org/~/media/Kauffman_org/research%20reports%20and%20covers/2
010/07/firm_formation_importance_of_startups.pdf. 
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funds as lenders, and traditional banks’ pullback on lending during and 
after the financial crisis of 2007-2008.18  Major asset-based lenders now 
include divisions of large banks such as Wells Fargo and Bank of America, 
commercial finance companies GE Capital and CIT Group, and hedge 
funds D.E. Shaw Group and Oaktree Capital Management. 
By the end of 2012, the amount of asset-based loans outstanding was 
at an all-time high of $620 billion—double that of a decade earlier.19  The 
growth of asset-based loans coincides with the growth of securitization and 
similar transactions that focus on financing assets isolated from 
enterprises.20  Importantly, these other asset-centric transactions have 
expanded the supply of credit in the economy21 because creditors more 
efficiently focus on the narrower range of risk associated with specific 
assets, as opposed to the risk of the company as whole that owns the assets.  
Asset-based loans nonetheless remain a small portion of the broader 
commercial loan market,22 and therefore have plenty of room to expand.  
Asset-based loans are often cheaper than other sources of capital and more 
borrower-friendly than other types of debt because lenders spend more 
resources screening and analyzing borrowers before making the loan.23  In 
addition, asset-based loans can be structured to meet the needs of a wide 
variety of borrowers.  The loans are thus also able to meet the needs of 
startups, including those with intellectual property assets.24  Startups are 
 
 18.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 19.  Ianthe J. Dugan, As Banks Retreat, Hedge Funds Smell Profit, WSJ.COM, July 22, 
2013, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324637504578567383459564510 
[hereinafter Dugan]. 
 20.  JOSEPH C. HU, ASSET SECURITIZATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 11-16 (2011). 
 21.  See FATEN SABRY & CHUDOZIE OKONGWU, NERA ECON. CONSULTING, STUDY OF 
THE IMPACT OF SECURITIZATION ON CONSUMERS, INVESTORS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND 
THE CAPITAL MARKETS 8-11, (2009), 
http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedfiles/ASF_NERA_Report.PDF (discussing 
the impact of securitization on the availability of credit). 
 22.  In 2011, U.S. asset-based loan issuance totaled $101 billion compared to $1.9 
trillion for the broader commercial syndicated loan market of which it is a part.  See Maria 
C. Dikeos, Asset-Based Lending Hits Record High in 2011, Expectations of Normalized 
Issuance Levels in 2012, ABF J. (March 2012), http://www.abfjournal.com/articles/asset-
based-lending-hits-record-high-in-2011-expectations-of-normalized-issuance-levels-in-
2012; Thompson Reuters, Global Syndicated Loans Review, (2011) at 1, 
http://dmi.thomsonreuters.com/Content/Files/4Q11_Global_Loans_Review.pdf. 
 23.  Brendan Swift, Assets a New Base for Mid-market Lending, BUS. REV. WEEKLY, 
Nov. 14, 2013 (“‘Whereas [non-asset-based lender] banks . . . will do less work at the front 
end around the value of the assets but will have a more strict covenant regime because they 
haven’t done the work at the front end.’”). 
 24.  For a broader analysis of the relationship between corporate governance structures 
and innovation, see Houman B. Shadab, Innovation and Corporate Governance: The Impact 
of Sarbanes-Oxley, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. EMPLOYMENT L. 955, 970-981 (2008). 
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likely not taking full advantge of asset-based loans due to their lack of 
awareness of the loans and the stigma traditionally associated with them.25 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Section I develops my theory of 
performance-sensitive debt.  My theory explains how performance 
sensitivity is a type of creditor governance mechanism and what structures 
and practices make up, or are related to, performance sensitivity.  It also 
distinguishes between ex post performance sensitivity that takes place after 
a loan is executed and ex ante performance sensitivity that is established 
upfront by contract.  Ex post performance sensitivity results from 
renegotiating loans after covenant breaches.  Ex ante performance 
sensitivity comes from performance pricing and borrowing base provisions.  
Section II considers the implications of performance sensitivity for the 
literatures on incomplete contracting, the efficiency of loan renegotiation, 
and capital structure.  Section III examines a uniquely performance-
sensitive instrument in the form of asset-based loans.  The loans reflect the 
theoretical aspects of performance sensitivity because in practice they are 
often more efficient for high-risk borrowers.  Section IV argues that asset-
based loans are uniquely suited to provide financing to certain high-risk 
startups. 
Overall, two basic themes in law and finance underlie this Article’s 
investigation of asset-based loans.  The first is that riskier borrowers are 
subject to more stringent creditor governance devices to compensate the 
lender for the heightened risk.  The second is that creditor governance 
mechanisms are substitutes for one another with respect to protecting 
creditors — the more one mechanism is used the less another type needs to 
be. 
I. A THEORY OF PERFORMANCE-SENSITIVE DEBT 
This Section develops my theory of performance-sensitive debt.  I first 
explain the nature of performance-sensitivity as a type of creditor 
governance mechanism.  I then explain the different types of performance 
sensitivity, which include renegotiation, performance pricing, and 
 
 25.  Roundtable on SME Finance and Business Growth GROWTH BUSINESS (Aug. 7, 
2013), http://www.growthbusiness.co.uk/growing-a-business/business-
finance/2389203/roundtable-on-sme-finance-and-business-growth.thtml.  Asset-based loans 
have also more recently become used by large public companies.  Randy Schwimmer, The 
Rebirth of Asset-Based Lending, CNN, June 1, 2011, 
http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2011/06/01/the-rebirth-of-asset-based-lending/ [hereinafter 
Schwimmer] (“While ABL is known as ‘lender of last resort’ for tougher credits, the current 
cycle has brought corporate heavyweights to the table like Georgia Gulf, Hertz, and Del 
Monte, as well as retailers like Sears, Neiman Marcus, Jo-Ann Stores, J Crew, and Liz 
Claiborne.”). 
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collateralization, as well as related mechanisms or structures such as 
monitoring and lines of credit. 
A. Creditor Governance and Performance Sensitivity 
Credit risk is the primary concern of creditors and explains much of 
the features of credit agreements and the interactions between borrowers 
and lenders.26  Credit risk is a governance concern, in addition to an 
economic problem, because of the presence of asymmetric information and 
potentially misaligned incentives in a creditor-debtor relationship.27  
Asymmetric information and misaligned incentives give rise to agency 
costs between creditors (as principals) and debtors (as agents) in the form 
of adverse selection, moral hazard, and other types of debtor opportunism 
that impose losses and inefficiencies on creditors.28  Particular agency costs 
include debtors increasing their overall risk after credit is extended (asset 
substitution) and taking on additional debt obligations that reduce their 
ability to repay existing creditors (claim dilution).29  To reduce or eliminate 
 
 26.  Creditors may also be concerned about the market value of their investment in 
secondary markets, which, in addition to credit risk, is primarily determined by market 
interest rates. 
 27.  See generally Charles K. Whitehead, Creditors and Debt Governance, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW (Claire Hill & Brett 
McDonnell, eds. 2012) [Whitehead, Debt Governance] (examining debt’s traditional role in 
lending and subsequent changes to this role). 
 28.  Adverse selection takes place when informational asymmetries increase the 
propensity of low quality borrowers to obtain credit because lenders are unable to 
distinguish between low and high quality borrowers and thereby charge an interest rate that 
is too high.  See generally George Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty 
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970) (examining the relationship between 
quality of goods and uncertainty).  Moral hazard occurs when a lender’s lack of knowledge 
over a borrower’s credit risk permits the borrower to engage in opportunistic behavior that 
benefits itself at the expense of the lender after the borrower obtains credit. See generally  
Masako N. Darrough & Neal M. Stoughton, Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: The 
Question of Financial Structure, 41 J. FIN. 501 (1986) (examining moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems). 
 29.  See Elazar Berkovitch & E. Han Kim, Financial Contracting and Leverage 
Induced Over- and Under-Investment Incentives, 45 J. FIN. 765, 766 (1990) (explaining 
potential problems related to seniority claims and discussing what an optimal seniority rule 
would look like); Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting, 7 J. 
FIN. ECON. 117, 118-19 (1979) [hereinafter Smith & Warner] (discussing potential sources 
of conflict between bondholders and stockholders).  For a review of the agency costs of 
debt, see generally William W. Bratton, Bond Covenants and Creditor Protection: 
Economics and Law, Theory and Practice, Substance and Process, in THE LAW AND 
ECONOMICS OF CREDITOR PROTECTION: A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE 43-47 (Horst 
Eidenmüller & Wolfgang Schön eds., 2008) (examining financial contracts in the United 
States and their benefits and drawbacks). 
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these agency costs of debt, creditors adopt creditor governance 
mechanisms. 
The most basic type of creditor governance mechanism is demanding 
a specific rate of interest to discipline a debtor and compensate creditors for 
the risks associated with the agency costs of debt.  Attempting to mitigate 
agency costs through interest rates is typically not sufficient, however, due 
to informational asymmetries and economic uncertainty that prevent 
interest payments alone to properly compensate the creditor for risk.  
Creditors accordingly adopt several other governance mechanisms to deal 
with credit risk. 
A ubiquitous and fundamental governance device is monitoring the 
financial condition of the borrower and its compliance with the terms of a 
credit agreement.30  Monitoring also includes screening potential borrowers 
before credit is extended to them.  Another governance mechanism is 
requiring the borrower to make certain promises to the lender in the form of 
contractual covenants.31  Debt covenants place significant constraints on 
debtors including on their ability to take on additional debt, use cash flows, 
and make investment decisions.32  Covenants also place performance 
requirements on borrowers.33  Securing a loan with collateral is a 
governance mechanism because it can help to reduce the losses upon a 
default and also because the very ability to use (certain types of) collateral 
may signal quality or allow creditors to screen borrowers.34  Credit risk 
transfer is a governance mechanism because selling a credit instrument or 
transferring its risk to another party by contract allows lenders to exert 
indirect control over debtors, who may be concerned about their debt being 
priced lower when it is sold.  Credit risk transfer is also a governance 
device because the secondary market price discovery of credit risk may 
 
 30.  See XAVIER FREIXAS & JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET, THE MICROECONOMICS OF 
BANKING 29 (2d. ed. 2008) (discussing studies pertaining to the creditor-borrower 
relationship); Tung, supra note 11, at 139 (2009) (discussing ways through which creditors 
monitor borrowers). 
 31.  See generally Nini et al., supra note 11 (asserting that creditors have an active role 
in corporate governance). 
 32.  See Tung, supra note 11, at 136-38 (discussing financial covenants and investment 
constraints). 
 33.  See George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive 
Corporate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1093–94 (1995) (discussing trip wire 
protections in covenants). 
 34.  See Tung, supra note 11, at 145 n132 (examining different protections in the 
creditor-borrower relationship); Gabriel Jiménez et al., Determinants of Collateral 2, 32 
(Eur. Fin. Ass’n 2004 Maastricht Meetings Paper No. 1455, 2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=565343 (examining ways to evaluate how borrower quality and 
collateral used are related). 
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discipline borrowers and help lenders in their monitoring activities.35 
A final type of governance device, and the one which is the focus of 
this Article, is performance sensitivity.  Performance sensitivity is any 
mechanism or activity that permits a creditor to adjust the credit risk of the 
instrument they hold before maturity (i.e., during the duration of the 
instrument).  The three main types of performance sensitivity I have 
identified are adjusting the interest rate to the creditworthiness of the 
borrower, adjusting the amount of credit available on the value of 
collateral, and renegotiation after breach of a debt covenant.  Performance 
sensitivity is a governance mechanism because it reduces credit risk and 
mitigates agency costs by altering the debtor-creditor relationship based on 
the creditworthiness of the debtor.  Performance sensitivity allows the price 
or structure of the credit instrument to adjust to new information about the 
creditor as it becomes available, thereby mitigating the costs to creditors of 
informational asymmetries.  Performance sensitivity also protects creditors 
against moral hazard by structuring the terms of the loans in its favor if the 
borrower begins to behave differently after the credit is extended. 
Two underlying principles govern creditor governance devices.  First, 
what creditor governance mechanisms are best used to reduce the agency 
costs of particular credit transactions depends on the characteristics of the 
transaction.36  The important characteristics of credit transactions include 
the debtor’s risk, the cost of obtaining information about the debtor (i.e., 
monitoring costs),37 and the ease with which the credit risk of the 
transaction can be transferred through a sale or synthetic risk transfer.  In 
general, higher risk debtors are subject to more (or more stringent) 
governance devices.  For example, compared to their lower risk peers, 
high-risk borrowers are typically monitored more, required to post more 
collateral, and are subject to more stringent covenants.38  Second, creditor 
 
 35.  See generally Charles K. Whitehead, The Evolution of Debt: Covenants, the Credit 
Market, and Corporate Governance, 34 J. CORP. L., 641 (2009) (examining changes in and 
discussing the bank-borrower relationship).  Secondary market pricing of credit risk not 
only includes the price of credit instruments in secondary market and the price of CDSs that 
reference such instruments. 
 36.  See Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression, 
in LES PRIX NOBEL: THE NOBEL PRIZES 2009 465 (Karl Grandin ed. 2009), 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-
sciences/laureates/2009/williamson_lecture.pdf (noting that “transactions, which differ in 
their attributes, are aligned with governance structures . . . so as to effect a (mainly) 
transaction cost economizing outcome”). 
 37.  Greater informational asymmetries imply higher monitoring costs. 
 38.  Indeed, the very existence of debt and its requirement to make fixed, periodic 
interest payments may serve as a check on managerial opportunism. See Milton Harris & 
Artur Raviv, Capital Structure and the Informational Role of Debt, 45 J. FIN. 321, 321-24 
(1990) (examining how debt can allow investors to discipline management); Tensie 
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governance mechanisms are also substitutes.  For example, lenders may 
engage in less monitoring or have less stringent covenants the more 
collateral there is backing the loan.39 
A fundamental issue is whether debtors or creditors benefit from 
performance sensitive debt.  Investors would prefer to have performance 
sensitive debt because it protects them from a sudden loss or collapse in 
value, or simply from an increase in risk without any corresponding benefit 
or protection.  Performance sensitivity may be especially important because 
it does not require the creditor to have to resort to secondary markets to sell 
the instrument or to find another party willing to take on (or share) the risk.  
In addition, one aspect of an optimal investment contract is the risk 
remaining constant throughout the life of the agreement,40 and performance 
sensitivity is precisely an attempt to achieve that type of optimality.41  
 
Steijvers & Wim Voordeckers, Collateral and Credit Rationing: A Review of Recent 
Empirical Studies as a Guide for Future Research, 23 J. ECON. SURVEYS 924, 927 (2009) 
(showing that collateral is used more the higher is the debtor’s risk or the higher are 
monitoring costs); Whitehead, Debt Governance, supra note 27, at 69 (discussing the 
traditional role of debt). 
 39.  In addition, less governance may take place to the extent external factors reduce the 
benefits of governance.  These external factors include reliance on third parties (such as 
ratings agencies) to assess credit risk, explicit or implicit governmental guarantees to 
creditors, an oversupply of credit,  a creditor’s privileged status under bankruptcy law,  or a 
creditor’s short-term orientation.  See Robert L. Hetzel, Too Big to Fail: Origins, 
Consequences, and Outlook, ECON. REV. 1, 11 (1991) (“Too big to fail . . . limits incentives 
for creditors to monitor the riskiness of bank asset portfolios.”).  See also Tung, supra note 
11, at 161 (looking at when lender governance is limited); Diana Hancock & Wayne 
Passmore, An Analysis of Government Guarantees and the Functioning of Asset-Backed 
Securities Markets (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, Finance and 
Economics Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2010-46, 2010) (securitization “investors 
are more likely to rely on implicit government guarantees . . . rather than to conduct a 
painstaking quantitative analysis of the underlying collateral”).  For example, the global 
credit glut from 2003 to 2007 led to competition among lenders that reduced reliance on 
stringent covenants in the form of covenant-lite loans (those with little or no covenants).  
See Viral V. Acharya et al., Private Equity: Boom and Bust?, 19 J. APPL. CORP. FIN. 44, 44-
46 (2007) (examining the leveraged buyout market); Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market’s 
Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 560-64 (2011) 
(examining how market-discipline mechanisms weakened); Richard Squire, Shareholder 
Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1200-01 (2010) 
(discussing the potential impact of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act’s 
requirement that regulators impose requirements on margins). 
 40.  See Id. 
 41.  Indeed, giving control to creditors contingent on the performance of debtors seems 
to enhance firm value. See generally Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete 
Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, 59 REV. ECON. STUDIES 473 (1992) 
[hereinafter Aghion & Bolton] (examining how to create the most efficient system of 
control allocation); Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, A Theory of Debt and Equity: 
Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence, 109 QRTLY. J. ECON. 1027 
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Debtors, on the other hand, may not want to issue a performance sensitive 
instrument because debtors benefit if the terms of their financing do not 
change in favor of the creditor if their performance deteriorates.  However, 
firms that expect their performance to improve may benefit from financing 
with performance-sensitive debt because improved performance means 
their interest rate or other terms of the loan will become more attractive.  In 
addition, debtors may benefit from performance sensitive loans because it 
allows their cost of capital to decrease (if their performance improves) 
without having to find a new source of capital.42  Of course, if the debtor is 
otherwise deemed too risky for any other type of loan, debtors may prefer a 
performance sensitive loan to no loan at all. 
B. The Mechanisms of Performance Sensitive Debt 
1. Prerequisites: Screening and Monitoring 
Two basic functions of lenders are screening borrowers before 
extending credit and monitoring borrowers during the life of a loan.43  
Screening permits informationally disadvantaged lenders to sort borrowers 
by their risk and decide whether and under what terms to extend credit.44  
Low-cost screening takes place when lenders offer some combination of 
interest rates and collateral requirements and largely rely on borrowers to 
self-select themselves.45  High-cost screening takes place when lenders 
investigate borrowers before extending credit to ensure they conform to the 
 
(1994) [hereinafter Dewatripont & Tirole] (discussing the relationship between an optimal 
capital structure and incentives that discipline managers). 
 42.  See generally Paul Asquith, Anne Beatty & Joseph Weber, Performance Pricing in 
Bank Debt Contracts, 40 J. ACCT. ECON. 101 (2005) [hereinafter Asquith et al.] (examining 
the effect of performance pricing in debt contracts). 
 43.  HANS DEGRYSE, MOSHE KIM & STEVEN ONGENA, MICROECONOMETRICS OF 
BANKING: METHODS, APPLICATIONS, AND RESULTS 9 (2009) [hereinafter Degryse]. 
 44.  See generally Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive 
Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 QRTLY. J. 
ECON. 629 (1976) (examining the impact that information inequality can have on market 
equilibriums).  See also C. Monica Capra, Irene Comeig & Matilde O. Fernandez, Moral 
hazard and Credit Screening: An Experiment (July 2009), 18th World IMACS / MODSIM 
Congress, Cairns, Australia 13-17, at 1426 (“When creditors offer a menu of contracts 
inducing the selection of firms, there is a separating equilibrium that reveals information and 
can resolve rationing.”), available at  https://mssanz.org.au/modsim09/D8/capra_D8.pdf. 
 45.  See generally Giovanni Dell’Ariccia & Robert Marquez, Lending Booms and 
Lending Standards, 61 J. FIN. 2511 (2006) (examining banks’ strategic behavior in relation 
with the information available to them); Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit 
Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 AMERICAN ECON. REV. 393 (1981) 
(discussing how imperfect information can lead to banks using credit rationining). 
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lender’s underwriting standards.46 
Performance sensitivity and screening are related in the following 
way: in addition to allowing lenders to filter and choose their borrowers, 
screening borrowers at the outset lowers ex post monitoring costs.  By 
engaging in costly screening, lenders should be better able to adopt contract 
structures that would otherwise not be economically justified due to their 
high monitoring costs, including the performance sensitive structures that 
have high monitoring costs.  Accordingly, costly screening is likely 
necessary in order for a performance sensitive contract to be economically 
feasible in the first place. 
In addition to screening, a performance-sensitive loan also requires 
substantial monitoring for the terms of the loan to be adjusted prior to 
maturity.  This is because the lender must ultimately observe information 
about the borrower’s performance to adjust the loan’s terms.  Lenders 
typically monitor a borrower in at least some respect due to borrowers 
generally having more information about their investments and the ability 
of lenders to use the borrowed funds opportunistically or in ways that 
destroy value.47 
An important aspect of lender monitoring relating to performance 
sensitivity is the incentives to monitor.  Performance-sensitive contracts 
require significant monitoring by lenders such that without sufficient 
incentives to monitor, performance sensitivity may not arise in the first 
place or otherwise not be effective.48  According to Cheol Park, a senior 
lender has the strongest incentive to monitor because they have something 
at stake in a liquidation whereas junior lenders will typically receive 
nothing.49  Accordingly, an equilibrium for high-risk firms is monitoring by 
a private lender with senior priority.50  Similar to Park, Amir Sufi and 
Joshua Rauh argue that a lender’s incentive to engage in costly monitoring 
will be strongest when the creditor is senior in the capital structure.  
 
 46.  See generally Cheng Wang & Stephen D. Williamson, Debt Contracts and 
Financial Intermediation with Costly Screening, 31 CANADIAN J. ECON. 573 (1998) 
(examining optimal financial intermediary structures in a specific credit market model). 
 47.  See generally Cheol Park, Monitoring and Structure of Debt Contracts, 55 J. FIN. 
2157 (2000) [hereinafter Park] (discussing what optimal debt structure would look like 
when there is a severe moral hazard problem).  The monitoring that takes place in credit 
relationships has long been the focus of finance research and scholarship.  Indeed, the very 
existence of financial intermediaries such as banks is generally understood to be a result of 
the need for specialized monitors.  Degryse, et al., supra note 43, at 9. 
 48.  Park, supra note 47. 
 49.  Id.  A creditor will also have a stronger incentive to monitor (and seek liquidation) 
in the presence of junior creditors because their claims in liquidation reduce the size of a 
senior lender’s claim.  Id. at 2159 (2000). 
 50.  Park, supra note 47; Joshua D. Rauh & Amir Sufi, Capital Structure and Debt 
Structure, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 4242, 4273 (2010) [hereinafter Rauh & Sufi]. 
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Otherwise, the lender must share the benefits of its own monitoring efforts 
with other lenders that have priority over its own claims.51 
However, a lender’s incentive to monitor may actually be the strongest 
if their claim is performance sensitive.  While it is true that lenders do not 
want other lenders to free-ride off of their monitoring efforts, a lender may 
be willing to tolerate free riding if their own costly monitoring (that other 
lenders benefit from) is necessary for the lender to benefit from 
performance sensitivity (e.g., being able to charge a higher interest rate).  
The benefits of performance sensitivity may outweigh the costs of some 
lenders free riding on another’s monitoring efforts.  Accordingly, while 
performance-sensitive debt is most likely to be used by senior lenders, it is 
efficient for subordinate lenders to use as well. 
Park also argues that the monitoring incentive should be assigned to 
the lender with the lowest monitoring costs.52  However, this seems 
incorrect.  If a creditor is given the ability to reduce their risk commitment 
in response to a borrower’s creditworthiness, they may be the most 
efficient monitor even though their monitoring costs are high.  Indeed, 
performance sensitive contracts are an exception to the general proposition 
that low cost monitors are the best monitors.  Focusing on the potentially 
large benefits of performance sensitivity allows one to appreciate that high 
monitoring costs may be worth bearing.  Bearing high monitoring costs up 
front may also be efficient because the costs of monitoring likely 
substantially decrease over time as a lender learns more about a borrower.  
The fact that repeated borrowing from the same lender leads to lower 
interest rates53 implies that the information lenders learn over the course of 
a long-term relationship substantially lowers the costs of monitoring. 
2. Ex Post Sensitivity: Renegotiation and Covenants 
A covenant is a contractual promise.  Loans, bonds, and other debt 
instruments typically contain numerous covenants from the debtor to the 
creditor in addition to the fundamental promise to repay the principal and 
make the scheduled interest payments.  There are three categories of 
 
 51.  See Rauh & Sufi, supra note 50, at 4256-57 (discussing the incentives that lead to 
the senior bank monitoring). 
 52.  Park, supra note 47. 
 53.  Sreedhar T. Bharath, et al., Lending Relationships and Loan Contract Terms, 24 
REV. FIN. STUD. 1141, 1141-44 (2011), 
http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/content/24/4/1141.full.pdf.  See also Arnoud W. A. Boot, 
Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?, 9 J. FIN. INTER. 7 (2000), 
http://www1.fee.uva.nl/fm/PAPeRS/Awaboot/english/Relationship_banking_know_JFI.pdf 
[hereinafter Boot] (bank acquisition of soft information reduces renegotiation costs). 
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covenants: affirmative promises to take certain actions, negative covenants 
to not take certain actions such as incurring additional debt, and financial 
covenants that promise to maintain a minimum level of performance.54  The 
primary function of covenants is to reduce agency costs by placing ex ante 
constraints on debtors that prevent wealth transfers from lenders to 
shareholders.55  For example, covenants reduce moral hazard.56  Financial 
covenants in particular act like early warning systems or tripwires that alert 
lenders to a decrease in borrower performance.57  By providing protection 
to lenders, covenants decrease credit risk and allow for loans with lower 
rates of interest.58  Another important purpose of covenants is to give 
lenders a right of exit: covenants are typically structured so that their 
violation permits the creditor to immediately accelerate the full amount of 
the loan. 
The use of covenants is indirectly related to performance sensitivity 
through the relationship between covenants and monitoring.  Covenants 
increase the incentive to monitor59 and help lenders monitor by requiring 
borrowers to produce information.60  Since monitoring is required for 
performance sensitivity to be effective, the use of covenants facilitates 
monitoring such that we should expect performance sensitive contracts to 
 
 54.  FRANK FABOZZI, HANDBOOK OF FINANCE, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTRUMENTS 
335-336 (2008). 
 55.  See generally Sudheer Chava & Michael Roberts, How Does Financing Impact 
Investment? The Role of Debt Covenants, 63 J. FIN. 2085 (2008) [hereinafter Chava & 
Roberts] (examining that the presence of covenants in financial contracts is motivated by 
their ability to mitigate agency problems). 
 56.  Smith & Warner, supra note 29. 
 57.  Clifford Smith, A Perspective on Accounting-based Debt Covenant Violations, 68 
ACCOUNTING REV. 289 (1993). 
 58.  Greg Nini, David C. Smith & Amir Sufi, Creditor Control Rights and Firm 
Investment Policy, 92 J. FIN. ECON 400 (2009) [hereinafter Nini et al.]; Michael Roberts & 
Amir Sufi, Control Rights and Capital Structure: An Empirical Investigation, 64 J. FINANCE 
1657 (2009) [hereinafter Roberts & Sufi]; Michael Bradley & Michael Roberts, The 
Structure and Pricing of Corporate Debt Covenants, (The Fuqua School of Business, Duke 
University, Working Paper, 2004); Natalia Reisel, On the Value of Restrictive Covenants: 
Empirical Investigation of Public Bond Issues, (September 2010)(unpublished Ph.D 
dissertation, Cox Business School at Southern Methodist University), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=644522.  The scope and nature of covenants is determined in part 
by tradeoffs between monitoring incentives, covenant-based hold up costs, and an increase 
in informational advantages to the lender.  Robert Prilmeier, The Structuring of Financial 
Covenants When Lenders Acquire Soft Information, (May 14, 2011)(unpublished Ph.D 
dissertation, Ohio State University), available at 
http://fisher.osu.edu/supplements/10/10869/Structuring-Financial.pdf. 
 59.  Raghuram Rajan & Andrew Winton, Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to 
Monitor, 50 J. FIN. 1113 (1995) [hereinafter Rajan & Winton]. 
 60.  Roberts & Sufi, supra note 58. 
SHADAB_FINAL (ARTICLE 3) - HBS EDITS 9-4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/5/2014  11:53 AM 
1094 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 16.4 
 
make use of information-producing covenants.61  Likewise, the use of 
covenants and performance sensitive provisions may to some extent be 
complementary because creditors already engaging in monitoring for one 
purpose will find it less costly to monitor for the other. 
The use of covenants is also related to performance sensitivity through 
the relationship between covenants and renegotiation.  Breach of a 
covenant typically qualifies as a technical default that gives the lender the 
right to immediately accelerate the full amount of the loan.  In practice, 
however, the remedy of acceleration is rarely used.  Most covenant 
breaches are technical and are typically waived by lender.62  Borrowers 
often breach a covenant,63 including borrowers that are healthy.64  To the 
extent there is any change after breach of a covenant, it results in the loan 
being renegotiated.65  Empirical studies find that covenant breaches cause 
loans to be modified with higher interest rates, less available credit, and a 
decrease in the borrower’s investment spending.66  This way, the process of 
covenant breach and renegotiation in favor of the lender enables the lender 
to be compensated for an increase in risk.67  Loan renegotiation is common, 
with one study finding that 76 percent of public companies’ loans were 
renegotiated before maturity.68  Covenant breach and renegotiation in favor 
of the lender is a form of performance sensitivity because it results in loan 
terms adjusting in response to the borrower’s performance.  The fact that 
covenant breaches are common indicates that renegotiation is an important 
form of performance sensitivity. 
 
 61.  This turns out to be true in the case of asset-based loans. See infra Section III.A. 
 62.  Roberts & Sufi, supra note 58. 
 63.  Michael Roberts & Amir Sufi, Renegotiation of Financial Contracts: Evidence 
from Private Credit Agreements, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 159 (2009). 
 64.  Robert Prilmeier, The Structuring of Financial Covenants When Lenders Acquire 
Soft Information, (May 14, 2011)(unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Ohio State University), 
available at http://fisher.osu.edu/supplements/10/10869/Structuring-Financial.pdf 
[hereinafter Prilmeier] 
 65.  Nini et al., supra note 58. 
 66.  Cem Demiroglu & Christopher. M. James, The Information Content of Bank Loan 
Covenants, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 3700 (2010); Roberts & Sufi, supra note 63. 
 67.  Clifford W. Smith, A Perspective on Violations of Accounting Based Debt 
Covenants, 68 Accounting Rev. 289 (1993); Ivan T. Ivanov, Contractual Contingencies and 
Renegotiation: Evidence from the Use of Pricing Grids, 7 (May 16, 2012) [hereinafter 
Ivanov] (unpublished dissertation, Kogod School of Business, American University), (“This 
security mechanism allows banks to be fairly compensated for increases in borrower credit 
risk.”) available at http://www.american.edu/kogod/research/upload/Ivanov-
performance_pricing15.pdf. 
 68.  Yiwei Dou, The Debt-Contracting Value of Accounting Numbers, Renegotiation, 
and  Investment Efficiency (February 2013) (unpublished dissertation, Stern School of 
Business, New York University), available at 
http://www.capana.net/conference2013/DOUYiwei2013Feb.pdf. 
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Although financial economists correctly note that a covenant breach 
allows a lender to reassess the borrower’s creditworthiness and impose 
value-enhancing additional covenants,69 the more important aspect from a 
performance sensitive view is that post-breach renegotiation results in the 
lender’s risk being adjusted (i.e., reduced) while the loan is still 
outstanding.  In addition, while economists are correct to view covenants as 
increasing firm value by allowing control to shift to creditors outside of 
bankruptcy,70 it is important to note that this control consists of 
performance sensitivity — not management.  Lenders do not begin to run 
the borrower’s business once a covenant is breached; rather, they reduce 
the risks they are exposed to through renegotiation. 
3. Ex Ante Performance Sensitivity 
i. Performance Pricing 
Commercial loans may contain performance pricing provisions that 
automatically adjust the loan’s interest rate in response to the performance 
of the borrower.  Performance pricing is a feature that causes the interest to 
fluctuate depending on the borrower’s performance as measured by a 
borrower’s credit rating or financial ratios such as debt-to-income, 
leverage, or interest coverage.71  Performance pricing provisions may be 
structured so that the interest rate increases if the borrower becomes less 
creditworthy or the interest rate decreases if performance improves (or 
both).72  Performance pricing came into widespread use in the 1990s and by 
one estimate is currently found in nearly three-quarters of all bank loans.73  
Figure 2a is an example of a performance pricing grid where the interest 
rate (as for Eurodollar Loans and Base Rate Loans) increases as the 
borrower’s performance decreases (as measured by the Consolidated 
Leverage Ratio).74  Figure 2b is an example of a performance pricing grid 
where the borrower’s performance is measured by the borrower’s credit 
ratings.75 
 
 69.  Chava & Roberts, supra note 55; Nini et al., supra note 58. 
 70.  Aghion & Bolton, supra note 41; Dewatripont & Tirole, supra note 41; Ilia D. 
Dichev & Douglas J. Skinner, Large–Sample Evidence on the Debt Covenant Hypothesis, 
40 J. ACCT. RES. 1091 (2002) [hereinafter Dichev & Skinner]. 
 71.  Asquith et al., supra note 42. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Roberts & Sufi, supra note 63. 
 74.  Parexel Int’l Corp., Term Loan Facility, (January 22, 2013) 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/799729/000079972913000002/a103termloanfacilit
yagreem.htm. 
 75.  Best Buy Co. Inc., 364-Day Credit Agreement, (April 11, 2013), 
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Figure 2a 
                                      
 
Figure 2b 
 
 
Performance pricing accordingly is a type of automatic, ex ante 
performance sensitivity negotiated prior to the loan transaction is closed.  
In the case of interest-increasing arrangements, performance pricing 
decreases the risk of the loan to counteract a decrease in the performance of 
the borrower.  A higher interest rate compensates the lender for the increase 
in borrower risk.  In the case of interest-decreasing arrangements, reducing 
 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/764478/000076447813000051/exhibit10162813-
rcf.htm. 
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the interest rate in response to improved performance tailors the loan to be 
more in line with what the borrower could receive at a market rate, and 
reduces incentives for the borrower to prepay, refinance, or attempt to 
renegotiate a lower interest rate. 
ii. Collateralization 
Securing a loan with collateral (collateralization), typically an asset 
owned by the borrower, is a basic creditor governance mechanism.  
Collateralization can help reduce potential losses to lenders because 
collateral can be sold and used to repay the loan if a borrower does not 
have enough cash.76  A primary justification for the use of collateral is that 
collateralization is a mechanism to reduce agency costs.  In particular, 
collateralization can reduce adverse selection costs by allowing higher 
quality borrowers to pledge collateral to signal their quality and thereby 
help lenders screen borrowers.77  Other theories argue that collateral is used 
to mitigate the effects of moral hazard (including risk-shifting and reduced 
effort)78 or the difficulty of enforcing contracts.79  Empirical studies find 
that companies that pledge (more) collateral tend to be riskier.80 
The use of collateral by itself is a blunt instrument in terms of 
performance sensitivity.  However, there are two ways in which collateral 
makes loans more performance sensitive.  First, using collateral assists 
lenders in tailoring their risk exposure ex ante because lenders are willing 
to make larger or longer-duration loans to borrowers that pledge collateral 
with higher liquidation values.81  Collateral puts a lower bound of a 
 
 76.  Tung, supra note 11, at 145 n.132. 
 77.  Effi Benmelech & Nittai Bergman, Collateral Pricing, (AFA 2008 New Orleans 
Meetings Paper, January 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=960787 [hereinafter 
Benmelech & Bergman]; Gabriel Jiménez et al., Determinants of Collateral 32 (EFA 2004 
Maastricht Meetings, Working Paper No. 1455, 2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=565343. 
 78.  Aghion & Bolton, supra note 41; Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, Financial 
Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector, 112 QRTLY. J. ECON. 663 (1997) 
[hereinafter Holmstrom & Tirole]. 
 79.   John H. Boyd & Bruce D. Smith, How Good are Standard Debt Contracts? 
Stochastic Versus Nonstochastic Monitoring in a Costly State Verification Environment, 67 
J. BUS. 539 (1994). 
 80.  See generally Allen N. Berger & Gregory Udell, Collateral, Loan Quality and 
Bank Risk, 25 J. MONET. ECON. 21 (1990) (finding that “collateral is most often associated 
with riskier borrowers, riskier loans and riskier banks”). 
 81.  Efraim Benmelech, Asset Salability and Debt Maturity: Evidence from 19th 
Century American Railroads, 22 REV. FIN. STUDIES 1545 (2009); Efraim Benmelech, Mark 
J. Garmaise & Tobias J. Moskowitz, Do Liquidation Values Affect Financial Contracts? 
Evidence from Commercial Loan Contracts and Zoning Regulation, 120 QUARTERLY J. 
ECON 1121 (2005); Oliver Hart & John Moore, A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability 
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creditor’s possible loss (i.e., at the liquidation value of collateral).82  
Collateral may also increase performance sensitivity indirectly to the extent 
it creates more incentives to monitor.  For example, collateral agreements 
may give lenders the ability to demand additional collateral.83  On the other 
hand, monitoring and collateral may be substitutes to the extent there is less 
of an incentive to monitor secured loans due to the very fact that the lender 
can resort to the collateral in case of borrower default.84  There is 
conflicting evidence regarding whether using collateral or monitoring is a 
lower cost form of governance.85 
Second, collateralization is a performance-sensitive debt characteristic 
when the terms of the loan adjust to the value of the borrower’s assets.  For 
example, the size of the loan may increase if the value of the collateral 
increases, and vice versa.  In addition, the size of the loan may be required 
to have a fixed ratio to the value of the collateral in an attempt to keep the 
lender’s risk constant, despite changes in the value of the collateral.  A loan 
may also contain covenants that are triggered if there is a significant drop 
in the value or credit ratings of the collateral.  In such a case the borrower 
may be required to post additional collateral or repay the loan upon demand 
of the lender. 
In practice, there are several types of performance sensitive 
collateralization arrangements.  One type is “margin financing,” which 
consists of financing the purchase of stocks or bonds with funds borrowed 
from a broker and having the purchased securities serve as collateral.  
Under such an arrangement, the broker will demand additional collateral 
(i.e., the securities) or cash if the value of the collateral falls below a pre-
established level.  A similar arrangement is also made in futures, swaps, 
and other derivatives transactions. For example, in a swaps transaction, one 
party will post collateral at the outset of the transaction.  At least daily, the 
value of the position will be re-evaluated and obligate the party on the side 
of the trade with the lower value to post addition collateral.86 
 
of Human Capital, 109 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 841 (1994); Benmelech & Bergman, supra 
note 77. 
 82.  However, the liquidation value of the collateral may decrease over the life of loan 
or be worth more to the borrower than the lender. Roberts & Sufi, supra note 63. 
 83.  Rajan & Winton, supra note 59. 
 84.  Michael Manove et al., Collateral vs. Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks, 
(Ctr. For Studies in Econ. and Fin., Working Paper No. 10, 2001), available at 
http://www.csef.it/WP/wp10.pdf. 
 85.  See Aaron A. Goetsmann & Gordon S. Roberts, Bank Relationships and 
Collateralization, in CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND CORPORATE FINANCING DECISIONS: THEORY, 
EVIDENCE, AND PRACTICE 287-80 (Baker and Martin eds. 2011). 
 86.  See Shadab, supra note 9, at 1041-42 (providing an overview of how collateral 
works as a governance mechanism). 
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In the commercial loan context, collateral financing takes the form of 
an asset-based loan in which the available amount of credit is limited to a 
specified percentage of eligible assets that make up the loan’s “borrowing 
base.”  If the value of the borrowing base falls below that of outstanding 
loans, the borrower is typically required to repay or collateralize (with 
cash) the deficiency.87  Asset-based loans as a type of performance-
sensitive debt are analyzed in depth in Section III. 
4. Lines of Credit 
A line of credit is a specified amount of funds that a borrower may 
borrow in separate discrete amounts up until the maximum (the “line”) for 
a specific amount of time (typically, a year).  In a committed line of credit, 
the lender is obligated to lend up until the line and would be in default to 
the borrower for not doing so.  The borrower only pays interest on the 
amount they have actually borrowed under the line, and not the total 
amount available.88  In a revolving line of credit, a borrower can borrow 
and repay any amount borrowed, usually for a specific time period of two 
to three years.  A line of credit can benefit borrowers because, with a credit 
line, a borrower does not have to pay interest on funds it has not drawn 
down.  A credit line also benefits lenders because it may reduce the agency 
costs that arise from managers having access to a surplus of cash. 
Theories of credit lines often focus on the choice of obtaining liquidity 
through cash or a line of credit.  These theories argue that lines of credit 
can be more efficient in helping firms manage their short-term liquidity 
needs than holding cash, largely by providing a form of insurance against 
cash flow disruptions.89  Agency theory also suggests that lines of credit are 
uniquely available from banks and other specialized lenders because they 
are able to bear the relatively higher monitoring costs and other costs 
associated with administering credit lines.90 
 
 87.  Borrowing Base: Overview (2013), PRACTICAL LAW (Apr. 14, 2014 3:44 AM), 
http://us.practicallaw.com/2-501-4029?source=relatedcontent [hereinafter Practical Law] 
 88.  FRANK J. FABOZZI, THE COMPLETE CFO HANDBOOK: FROM ACCOUNTING TO 
ACCOUNTABILITY 88 (2007).  If the line of credit is committed, the borrower also pays a 
commitment fee (typically calculated as a percentage of the outstanding amount not 
borrowed) or is required to keep a cash balance in a separate account (known as a 
compensating balance). Id. 
 89.  See generally Holmstrom & Tirole, supra note 78. 
 90.  See generally Evan Gatev & Philip Strahan, Banks’ Advantage in Hedging 
Liquidity Risk: Theory and Evidence from the Commercial Paper Market, 61 J. FIN. 867 
(2006) (examining how banks are able to hedge against liquidity shocks affecting entire 
markets); Anil Kashyap et al., Banks as Liquidity Providers: An Explanation for the 
Coexistence of Lending and Deposit-Taking. 57 J. FIN. 33 (2002) (examining how banks 
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A line of credit by itself is generally not performance sensitive.  A 
decrease in a borrower’s creditworthiness will not necessarily decrease the 
amount already outstanding to the borrower or the size of the credit facility.  
There are, however, several ways in which a line of credit depends on the 
creditworthiness of the borrower.91  First, a line of credit may be contingent 
on a borrower’s compliance with loan covenants.  In addition to demanding 
immediate repayment of the entire loan facility, violations of covenants 
may allow the lender to decrease the size of the line of credit or negotiate 
other provisions of the loan to protect themselves.  Lines of credit also 
typically have material adverse change clauses that allow a lender to 
withhold funds if the borrower undergoes a significant decrease in 
creditworthiness.  The amount of funds available under a credit line may 
also be tied to the value of the assets that secure the facility.  In an asset-
based loan, a borrowing base provision ties the size of the credit line to 
value of certain assets, causing the size of the credit facility to fluctuate 
based on the assets’ value. 
II. IMPLICATIONS OF PERFORMANCE-SENSITIVE DEBT 
This Section considers how my theory of performance-sensitive debt 
interacts with three bodies of academic finance literature: incomplete 
contracting, the economics of renegotiation, and capital structure research.  
These literatures support the proposition that performance-sensitivity is an 
efficiency enhancing governance mechanism for high-risk borrowers.  This 
Section also considers how performance sensitivity, despite increasing 
efficiency, may increase the ability of lenders to be opportunistic and 
benefit themselves at the expense of lenders.  Subsequent Sections of this 
Article apply the ideas developed in this Section by analyzing 
performance-sensitive asset-based loans in general and when made to high-
risk startups in particular. 
A. Theoretical Implications 
1. Incomplete Contracting 
A central tenet of the theory of incomplete contracts is that all real-
world contracts are incomplete to some extent due to factors including 
 
provide liquidity on demand). 
 91.  See generally Amir Sufi, Bank Lines of Credit in Corporate Finance: An Empirical 
Analysis, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1057 (2009)  (explaining how banks are only viable liquidity 
substitutes for organizations with high cash flow). 
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imperfect knowledge (bounded rationality), the inability for third parties to 
verify future states of the world (and hence enforce contract terms), the 
upfront costs of negotiating, and the ex post costs of monitoring.92  A 
contract is complete to the extent it makes obligations contingent on 
circumstances, a property known as state-contingency.93 
Ex ante performance sensitivity is a form of contractual completeness 
because the terms of the agreement are contingent upon the borrower’s 
performance.  Contracts with performance pricing and borrowing base 
provisions are more complete than contracts that do not adjust the terms of 
the agreement in relation to the performance of the borrower. 
Contract theorists argue that transaction costs and property rights 
determine the relative completeness of efficient contracts.94  This research 
also finds that complete contracts are more efficient when (1) future states 
are third-party verifiable (and hence enforceable);95 (2) renegotiation is 
costly; (3) or monitoring costs are low. In general, incomplete contracting 
research supports direct empirical findings that performance-sensitive 
contracts are more efficient when agency costs or transaction costs are 
high.96 
 
 92.  See Benjamin E. Hermalin et al., Contract Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS, 63, 70-75 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) [hereinafter 
Hermalin] (discussing how the desirability of contract liability depends on the ex post 
bargaining situations of the parties).  See generally George Hendrikse & Josef Windsperger, 
Determinants of Contractual Completeness in Franchising, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 
THEORY OF NETWORKS: FRANCHISING, COOPERATIVES AND ALLIANCES 13 (Mika Tuunanen et 
al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter Hendrikse & Windsperger] (examining what determines whether 
a contract is complete). 
 93.  See generally Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of 
Incomplete Contracts, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159 (1994) (examining whether the judicial 
system is competent in filling in contract ambiguities and how it does so); Alan Schwartz, 
Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial 
Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992) (examining how judges address relational and 
incomplete contracts). 
 94.  See Hendrikse & Windsperger, supra note 92, at 13 (explaining how contract 
completeness is determined and some factors that are examined). 
 95.  See Hermalin, supra note 92, at 63 (discussing the formal conditions of contractual 
completeness). 
 96.  See generally Asquith et al., supra note 42  (examining the relationship between 
bank debt interest rate spreads and contracts with performance pricing).  See Ilia D. Dichev 
et al., The Role and Characteristics of Accounting-based Performance Pricing in Private 
Debt Contracts 2 (June 2002) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Social Sciences 
Research Network), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=318399 (arguing that 
“performance pricing improves the efficiency of contracting by reducing renegotiation costs 
and renewal costs, alleviating agency costs, and allowing for longer life contracts”).  See 
generally J.L. Souza, Effectiveness of Commercial Debt Pricing Using Alternate Pricing 
Structures (Working Paper, 2012), available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2135714 (stating 
that performance pricing is efficient and reduces agency costs); Karan Bhanot & Antonio S. 
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First, relatively complete performance-sensitive debt contracts are 
indeed third-party verifiable.  Performance pricing and borrowing bases 
rely on verifiable outcomes; namely, the measurable performance of the 
borrower and the market value of the borrowing base assets. 
Second, performance sensitivity lowers renegotiation costs because it 
automatically adjusts the exposure of the lender to the borrower—without 
having to renegotiate any contract terms.  Doing so should increase 
contracting efficiency because contracts with less room for (Pareto-
improving) renegotiation are more efficient.  Indeed, a major force driving 
the widespread adoption of performance pricing provisions in the 1990s 
was to save on the transaction costs of renegotiating loan contracts.97  
Empirical studies also find that performance pricing is associated with less 
room for mutually beneficial renegotiation,98 implying that such provisions 
are more efficient.  In addition, Tim Adam and Daniel Streitz found that 
covenants are looser if performance pricing provisions are used.  This 
finding implies that performance pricing is a substitute for covenant-related 
renegotiation,99 an implication that is consistent with creditor governance 
devices being tradeoffs with one another. 
Third, because performance sensitivity requires costly monitoring to 
implement, such contracts are far more likely to be efficient if monitoring 
costs are low—just as incomplete contracting research suggests.  However, 
there may be an efficient equilibrium where contracts combine monitoring 
 
Mello, Should Corporate Debt Include a Rating Trigger?, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 69 (2006) 
(examining the incentives for including a rating trigger); Gustavo Manso et al., 
Performance-Sensitive Debt, REV. FIN. STUDIES (2010), available at 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/manso/psd.pdf (examining performance-sensitive debt); 
Kamphol Panyagomet et al., Performance Pricing Covenants and Corporate Loan Spreads 
(Working Paper, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2255061  [hereinafter 
Kamphol Panyagomet et al.] (finding that interest rates are lower for interest-increasing 
performance pricing loans). 
 97.  See Ivan T. Ivanov, Essays on Debt Financing and Financial Distress 6 (2012) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Rochester), available at 
https://urresearch.rochester.edu/institutionalPublicationPublicView.action?institutionalItemI
d=24470 (“Discussions with practitioners revealed that saving on renegotiation costs was 
one of the primary reasons for the trend towards widespread adoption of performance 
pricing in the bank debt market in the early 1990s.”). 
 98.  Id. See also Valeri V. Nikolaev, Scope for Renegotiation in Private Debt Contracts 
22 ( Working Paper, 2013),  available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2012526 [hereinafter 
Nikolaev] (examining the relationship between conflicts in negotiating contracts and debt 
contract renegotiations). 
 99.  See Tim R. Adam & Daniel Streitz, Bank Lending Relationships and the Use of 
Performance Sensitive Debt 3-4 (SFB 649 Discussion, Working Paper No. 2013-027, 2013), 
available at https://www.econstor.eu/dspace/bitstream/10419/79608/1/746444923.pdf 
[hereinafter Tim R. Adam & Daniel Streitz] (demonstrating that performance-sensitive debt 
decreases hold-up problems in relationships involving repeated interaction). 
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and contractual completeness.  Performance pricing is a way to reveal 
information and overcome informational asymmetries.100  That is, it may be 
efficient to undertake costly monitoring in the presence of a relatively 
complete contract because the benefits to the lender in the form of having 
performance-sensitive debt contract outweigh the additional monitoring 
costs.  The foregoing is also supported by a model developed by Alexei 
Tchistyi, who argues that performance pricing is an optimal contract in the 
presence of an opportunistic manager with more information than the 
lender.101 
A final important aspect of the relationship between contract 
efficiency and performance-sensitive debt is that empirical studies suggest 
that performance sensitivity creates more efficient contracts in the context 
of high-risk borrowers.  Adam and Streitz find that (accounting-based) 
performance pricing provisions are more likely to be found in a long-term, 
repeated lending relationship and with less established firms that have 
fewer outside financing options.102  Although the authors interpret these 
findings as borrowers attempting to protect themselves against being held 
up by lenders in renegotiation, the findings are also consistent with 
performance sensitivity being used by lenders for firms that are the riskiest 
or have the most informational asymmetries. Asquith et al. find that 
interest-increasing performance pricing is more likely to be used in loans if 
the borrower is more likely to experience a decline in credit quality, 
especially for loans where the borrower can increase their borrowings with 
lender approval.103  With respect to borrowing base provisions, empirical 
evidence finds that the provisions are used by firms with higher risk and 
informational asymmetry104 and that the use of borrowing base provisions 
increases as creditworthiness decreases.105  Empirical evidence also finds 
that performance-sensitive borrowing base provisions are associated with a 
larger scope for mutually beneficial renegotiation, which provides 
additional support that borrowing bases are best for high-risk firms that 
 
 100.  See Kamphol Panyagomet et al., supra note 96, at 26  (finding that “[p]erformance 
pricing covenants . . . are predicted to reduce loan spreads as they serve to control costs 
associated with asymmetric information . . . .”). 
 101.  See generally Alexei Tchistyi, Security Design with Correlated Hidden Cash 
Flows: The Optimality of Performance Pricing (Haas School of Business, University of 
California, Berkeley, Working Paper, 2013),  available at 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/Tchistyi/MD.pdf (examining optimal security design in 
instances where project managers can divert cash flows for personal use). 
 102.  Tim R. Adam & Daniel Streitz, supra note 99,  at 3-4. 
 103.  Asquith et al., supra note 42. 
 104.  Mark J. Flannery & Xiaohong (Sara) Wang, Borrowing Base Revolvers: Liquidity 
for Risk Firms, (Working Paper , 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1741306. 
 105.  Rauh & Sufi, supra note 50, at 4270-71 
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lenders should expect to learn about over time.106 
2. Loan Renegotiation and Efficiency 
Renegotiating a loan contract before maturity is an ex post form of 
performance sensitivity that seems to generally increase contract efficiency.  
Renegotiation is efficient when it allows the parties to strike a better 
bargain based upon changed circumstances or new information.  This is 
usually the case when renegotiation is cheap and incorporates new 
information about the borrower and hence presents an opportunity for the 
parties to adjust the agreement to better reflect the true risk of the loan.107  
There tends to be more room for efficient (Pareto-improving) renegotiation 
when there are high informational asymmetries and agency conflicts are 
likely.108 
Renegotiation may be inefficient when the costs of renegotiation are 
high, borrowers possess informational advantages over lenders,109 or 
multiple creditors create collective action problems.110  Renegotiation may 
also be inefficient because, if renegotiation in favor of the lender is 
anticipated at the time of contracting, it may lead the borrower to 
underinvest and not expend as much effort as it otherwise would have to 
avoid having its profits appropriated by a lender with bargaining power (the 
hold-up problem).111 
More or tighter covenants create more potential for covenant breaches, 
and hence increase the likelihood of renegotiation.112  Theory and evidence 
on the use of debt covenants suggests that renegotiation after breach of a 
covenant is an efficiency enhancing activity.  Debt covenants are tighter the 
more borrowers know about projects than lenders and the more costly it is 
to become informed.113  Indeed, as lenders learn more about borrowers 
through repeated borrowings, lenders reduce covenants.114  These findings 
 
 106.  Nikolaev, supra note 98, at 22-23. 
 107.  See id. at 7-9. 
 108.  Ivanov, supra note 67. 
 109.  There is less scope for renegotiation the more there is informational asymmetry.  
Nikolaev, supra note 98, at 7-9. 
 110.  Klaus M. Schmidt, The Economics of Covenants as a Means of Efficient Creditor 
Protection, 7 EURO. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 89, 90 (2006). 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Renegotiable contracts also have tighter covenants because lenders know they can 
be relaxed later. Mitchel Berlin & Loretta J. Mester, Debt Covenants and Renegotiation, 2 J. 
FIN. INTER. 95 (1992) [hereinafter Berlin & Mester]. 
 113.  Nicolae Garleanu & Jeffrey Zwiebel, Design and Renegotiation of Debt Covenants, 
22 REV. FIN. STUD. 749 (2009); Park, supra note 47; Prilmeier, supra note 64, at 5 (covenant 
tightness decreases the closer the relationship between debtors and creditors). 
 114.  Prilmeier, supra note 64, at 4-5. Covenant tightness contains private information 
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indicate that there are more or tighter covenants when lenders know less 
about borrowers and want to reserve the right to renegotiate.  Renegotiation 
accordingly seems to progressively reveal more information about 
borrowers to create more efficient contracts.115 
The fact that borrowers’ earnings and stock price improve after 
covenant violations116 also suggests that performance sensitivity through 
renegotiation is efficiency enhancing.  Contracts with more or tighter 
covenants generally have more room for value-enhancing (efficient) 
renegotiation.117  In addition, negative covenants are more valuable when 
borrowers are more likely to impose moral hazard agency costs on lenders 
(such as risk-shifting, excessive dividends, and over or under-
investment).118  Part of the value likely stems from lenders wanting to 
renegotiate the covenants in their favor if they are violated. 
Performance sensitivity through renegotiation seems particularly 
valuable for higher risk borrowers.  Sufi and Rauh, for example, find a 
sharp increase in covenant usage as a borrower’s credit quality decreases.119  
For high-risk borrowers, value-enhancing renegotiation that reduces 
information problems and agency costs takes place almost continuously.120  
Indeed, high-risk borrowers likely benefit the most from renegotiation 
because it generally results in more borrower-friendly terms.121  For 
example, a lender may initially set loan terms too strict to compensate for a 
potential decrease in a high-risk borrower’s performance over the life of the 
loan.122  Nonetheless, any problems a lender has estimating the borrower’s 
decrease in performance can be mitigated by setting covenants tightly so 
that they are likely to be renegotiated.123 
 
about the firm’s prospects, but covenant intensity does not.  Id. at 6; Demiroglu & James, 
supra note 66. 
 115.  Boot, supra note 53. 
 116.  Nini et al., supra note 58. 
 117.  The particular covenants are those that constrain managers and certain financial 
covenants. Nikolaev, supra note 98. 
 118.  Michael Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Stewart C. 
Meyers, The Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147 (1977); Smith & 
Warner, supra note 29. 
 119.  Rauh & Sufi, supra note 50, at 4270. 
 120.  Nikolaev, supra note 98, at 4-8. 
 121.  See Berlin & Mester, supra note 112  (finding that “firms with high ex ante credit 
risk find the option to renegotiate most valuable”). 
 122.  See Asquith et al., supra note 42. 
 123.  Dichev & Skinner, supra note 70. 
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3. Capital Structure 
My theory of performance sensitivity draws upon, has implications 
for, and challenges existing theories of corporate finance and debt 
contracting.  Capital structure refers to a fundamental characteristic of any 
firm; namely, the ratio of its debt to equity.  Capital structure theory 
investigates why firms adopt a particular capital structure and the 
efficiency of doing so.124  My theory casts a new light on capital structure 
theory, and posits that capital structure decisions take into account the 
performance sensitivity of the instruments available to firms.  Borrowers 
with higher risk or agency costs will raise capital with the most 
performance sensitive instruments—debt with robust covenants, 
performance pricing provisions, or borrowing base clauses.  To properly 
assess the role of performance sensitivity, we must compare not only the 
ratio of debt to equity but also the types of debt, which may be more or less 
performance sensitive. 
The basis of much capital structure theory is the Modigliani–Miller 
irrelevance principle first developed in 1958.  It posits that under certain 
assumptions a firm’s choice between debt and equity is irrelevant to its 
value.125  These assumptions, including perfectly efficient markets and the 
lack of taxes, bankruptcy, or agency costs, are highly unrealistic.  
Moreover, the Modigliani–Miller irrelevance principle implicitly assumes 
that financial instruments do not vary in their degree of performance 
sensitivity.  Due to the principle’s lack of realism, several other capital 
structure theories have developed in the years since the principle was first 
developed. 
According to the trade-off theory, a firm’s choice of capital structure 
represents a tradeoff between the actual costs and benefits to the firm from 
financing with either debt or equity.  The most important tradeoffs include 
the tax deduction and agency cost reduction of debt financing versus the 
increased bankruptcy cost of additional leverage.126  According to the 
 
 124.  Based on a sample of 1889 public non-financial companies, Rauh and Sufi found 
that the average debt to capital ratio was 50 percent and that bonds and bank debt make up 
19 percent and 13 percent of the capital structure, respectively.  Rauh & Sufi, supra note 50.  
In terms of priority, they found that on average 25 percent of a firm’s capital structure 
consists of unsecured debt, 15 percent is made up of secured debt, and subordinated debt 
(mostly bonds and convertible debt) makes up 11 percent.  Id. Most firms use more than one 
type of debt financing and about a quarter make a significant change in their debt structure 
over time.  Id. 
 125.  Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance 
and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958). 
 126.  Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment 
Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187 
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pecking-order theory, a firm’s capital structure reflects the general 
preference of firms for funding themselves first with their own profits, then 
debt, and then equity—in that order.127  This “pecking order” is driven by 
manager-investor informational asymmetries, and also by agency conflicts, 
and taxes.128  For example, when investors perceive that managers have 
more information than they do, they will create an adverse selection 
problem and underprice the firm’s equity securities, which gives the firm a 
preference for debt over equity.129  According to the signaling theory of 
capital structure, firms use their capital structure to signal quality about 
themselves and thereby overcome asymmetric information.130  For 
example, debt is issued by firms to signal high quality as reflected in their 
ability to pay it back.131 
Focusing on performance sensitivity has implications for all of these 
theories.  First, it suggests that an additional important tradeoff between 
debt and equity are the costs and benefits of using performance-sensitive 
financing.  As noted earlier,132 firms that expect their performance to 
improve may benefit from financing with performance-sensitive debt 
because improved performance means their interest rate or other terms of 
the loan will become more attractive.  Second, my theory also challenges 
the pecking order theory because it suggests that in some cases 
informational asymmetries may make a firm prefer equity over debt.  For 
example, an informationally opaque borrower may prefer to issue relatively 
costly equity than agree to a performance-sensitive loan that may trap it 
with higher interest rates if its performance declines.  Third, my theory 
bolsters signaling theory because it suggests that firms attempt to signal 
quality through performance sensitive debt not only because they have to 
pay it back, but also because issuers are willing to commit to having their 
capital taken away or become more costly due to their increased risk over 
the life of the loan.  Consistent with this explanation is a study of 
performance-sensitive debt finding that borrowers agree to performance 
pricing to signal their quality to lenders and are rewarded with larger and 
 
(1984) [hereinafter Myers & Majluf]. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Stewart C. Myers, Financing of Corporations, in 1A HANDBOOK OF THE 
ECONOMICS OF FINANCE: CORPORATE FINANCE (Constantinides & Stulz eds. 2003); J.B. 
Heaton, Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance, 31 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 33 
(2002). 
 129.  Myers & Majluf, supra note 126. 
 130.  See Stephen A. Ross, The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-
Signaling Approach, 8 BEL. J. ECON. 23 (1977). 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  See infra, Section I.A. 
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cheaper loans.133 
Other theories and findings in corporate finance are consistent with 
my claim that firms with lower creditworthiness tend to issue more 
performance sensitive debt.  One theory is that firms switch to using non-
performance sensitive debt (i.e., bonds) from performance sensitive bank 
debt as their credit quality improves.134  One explanation for this is that 
high quality borrowers can borrow at arm’s length in capital markets and 
not bear costs associated with bank monitoring.135  But another explanation 
is based on performance sensitivity: lenders are not willing to extend credit 
to low-quality firms unless their outstanding risk adjusts to the performance 
of borrowers.  The need for performance sensitivity also explains why the 
greater monitoring intensity found in private debt compared to bonds is 
higher with lower quality firms.136  Sufi and Ruah find that while lower 
quality firms rely on a mix of different types of debt instruments, higher 
quality investment grade firms rely on senior unsecured debt and equity.  In 
other words, lower quality firms have much less access to unsecured debt 
that lacks performance sensitivity.137  Lower quality firms rely on bank 
debt, which is performance sensitive because it has tight covenants and 
(most likely) performance pricing provisions.138  Likewise, when firms’ 
credit ratings are downgraded, they increasingly rely on bank debt.139  
Accordingly, borrowers’ use of more or less performance sensitive debt is 
consistent with such debt being used by higher risk borrowers. 
B. Creditor Opportunism 
Performance sensitive contracts may either increase or decrease the 
 
 133.  Taylor A. Begley, Signaling, Financial Constraints, and Performance Sensitive 
Debt, (Working Paper, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2140217 (find[ing] that 
constrained firms that use convex pricing grids receive loans that are 21-28% larger with a 
spread that is 31-37 basis points lower than observationally similar borrowers that use fixed 
spread loans”).  Bannier and Wiemann argue that only credit ratings-based performance 
pricing, and not accounting-based performance pricing, are used to signal a borrower’s 
quality because the former provide for larger spread reductions.  Christina E. Bannier & M. 
Wiemann, Performance Pricing in Bank Loan Contracts–Accounting-Based Versus Rating-
Based Pricing Designs, (Working Paper, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2141797. 
 134.  Arnold W. A. Boot & Anjan V. Thakor, Financial System Architecture, 10 REV. 
FIN. STUDIES 693 (1997). 
 135.  Douglas W. Diamond, Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice Between Bank 
Loans and Directly Placed Debt, 99 J. POL. ECON. 689 (1991). 
 136.  Rauh & Sufi, supra note 50, at 4273. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. 
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ability of creditors to engage in opportunistic behavior against borrowers.  
Creditor opportunism is conduct taken by a creditor to obtain a benefit, 
such as higher interest rates or tighter covenants, not explicitly or implicitly 
agreed upon by the initial agreement.140  Creditor opportunism typically 
consists of creditors taking advantage of a distressed borrower in a way that 
benefits themselves at the expense of the debtor.141  Creditor opportunism 
may arise more generally because the informational advantages a lender 
obtains after having a long-term relationship with a borrower allow the 
lender to take advantage of the fact that the borrower will incur additional 
costs if it tries to obtain a new lender.142 
The greater the likelihood or scope for renegotiation, the more likely it 
is that lenders will be able to behave opportunistically.  This is because 
lenders with a credible threat of liquidation may be able to renegotiate the 
loan in their favor.  However, such renegotiation may be inefficient due to 
causing the borrower to increase its risk taking activities subsequent to the 
renegotiation to compensate for having to share more of its profits with 
then lender.143  It may also cause inefficiencies because the mere prospect 
of having to share more profits with a lender than originally anticipated can 
reduce the incentives of borrowers to engage in profitable projects.144 
However, ex ante performance sensitive contracts in the form of 
performance pricing and collateralization may reduce the ability for 
creditors to act opportunistically.  Ex ante performance sensitivity reduces 
the scope of renegotiation by setting at the outset of the contract what 
debtor or asset distress may do to the interest rate or loan amount.  The 
impact of borrower distress on certain aspects of the loan is already 
determined such that creditors cannot take advantage of the distress.  In 
addition, to the extent that ex ante performance sensitivity is generally a 
tradeoff with tighter or more extensive covenants, performance sensitive 
loans will be less likely to be renegotiated in favor of the creditor in the 
first place.  On the other hand, because collateral-financed performance 
sensitive loans require giving the lender a security interest in assets that 
determine the size of the loan obligation, the loans may increase creditor 
 
 140.  Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131, 138 
(1989). 
 141.  Jonathan C. Lipson, Controlling Creditor Opportunism, 9 (Univ. of Wisconsin 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1129, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1662127. 
 142.  Jan Mahrt-Smith, Should Banks Own Equity Stakes in Their Borrowers? A 
Contractual Solution to Hold-up Problems, 30 J. BANK. FIN. 2911 (2006). 
 143.  Gary Gorton & James Kahn, The Design of Bank Loan Contracts, 13 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 331, 340 (2000). 
 144.  Raghuram G. Rajan, Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and 
Arm’s-length Debt, 47 J. FIN. 1367 (1992). 
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opportunism because the use of collateral exacerbates the hold-up 
problem.145  Specific aspects of asset-based lender opportunism are 
discussed in Section IV.C. 
III. ASSET-BASED LENDING 
This Section focuses on a unique type of performance-sensitive debt 
in the form of asset-based loans.  It builds upon the previous Sections by 
analyzing the real-word application of a loan that utilizes several of the 
creditor governance mechanisms of performance-sensitive debt analyzed in 
Section I; namely, monitoring and screening, performance pricing, lines of 
credit, and collateral-based finance in the form of a borrowing base.  Asset-
based loans embody many of the principles identified in Section II 
regarding the efficiency of performance-sensitive loans: asset-based loan 
structures reduce agency costs by disciplining borrowers and providing a 
constant flow of information to lenders.  The use of asset-based loans is 
also consistent with the general principle of financial law that loans with 
strong protections for creditors are uniquely available to high-risk 
borrowers. 
A. Basic Structure 
Asset-based lending is a type of debt finance that involves making a 
revolving line of credit available to a borrower based on the value of its 
assets.146  It is performance sensitive because any particular time the 
amount of funds made available to a borrower (i.e., the size of the credit 
facility) may change depending on the performance of the collateral in the 
borrower’s borrowing base.  If the value of the collateral increases, 
additional funds will be made available to the borrower, and vice versa.  
Consistent with what is predicted by theories of creditor monitoring,147 
asset-based lending takes the form of a senior, secured loan.  An asset-
based lender has first priority recourse to collateral if the borrower cannot 
satisfy its debt obligation.148  However, in a typical secured loan, which is 
 
 145.  See infra, Section I.E. 
 146.  A line of credit is revolving, meaning the amount of outstanding funds actually 
used by the borrower (the borrower’s balance) increases or decreases over time depending 
on whether an advance is made to the borrower or the borrower pays down a portion of the 
loan balance. GE CAPITAL, GUIDE TO ASSET BASED LENDING 9 (1999), 
http://www.gelending.com/Clg/Resources/PDF/guide/asset_guide.pdf; ROBERT T. SLEE, 
PRIVATE CAPITAL MARKETS: VALUATION, CAPITALIZATION, AND TRANSFER OF PRIVATE 
BUSINESS INTERESTS 315 (2011) [hereinafter Slee]. 
 147.  See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. 
 148.  Slee, supra note 146. 
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non-asset-based, the primary determinant of the size and terms of a loan are 
the cash flows and overall financial strength of the borrower at the entity-
level, and collateral is only resorted to for repayment as a last resort.  By 
contrast, asset-based lending is different than typical secured loans due to 
the additional prominence played by collateral.  In an asset-based loan, the 
value of the collateral determines the size of the loan and the collateral is 
the primary source of repayment.149 
The asset-based loan industry consists of a three-tier structure 
differentiated by the level of risk the lenders are willing take on and the 
size of the loans they make.  Lenders in the first tier consist of asset-based 
lending divisions of major commercial banks.150  They generally make 
loans of $15 million and larger to the most stable borrowers and charge an 
interest rate at two percent above the prime rate.151  Second or mid-tier 
asset-based lenders generally make loans of $3 to $15 million at an interest 
rate of the prime rate plus four percent.152  Finally, third tier asset-based 
lenders generally make loans smaller than $3 million and charge the prime 
rate plus 9 percent.153  Third tier asset-based lenders are comprised of 
independent commercial finance companies and are the most concerned 
with the liquidation value of the collateral and the least with the earnings of 
the borrower; they are even willing to lend to borrowers with a negative 
earning capacity.  Third tier asset-based lenders have the loosest financial 
covenants, engage in the most intense monitoring, and may reserve the 
right to call the loan at any time with adequate notice.154 
B. Monitoring in Asset-Based Loans 
As discussed in Section I,155 screening and monitoring are 
prerequisites for undertaking performance sensitive lending.  For asset-
based loans, screening assets and monitoring their value are two defining 
aspects of the loan.  By contrast, in typical secured (i.e., non-asset-based) 
loans, lenders do not engage in the type of intense collateral monitoring as 
they do in asset-based lending.  In an asset-based loan, the collateral is 
screened by lenders before becoming part of the borrowing base and it is 
actively monitored after the loan is made.  Active monitoring of loan 
collateral is consistent with my observation above that performance 
 
 149.  GREGORY F. UDELL, ASSET-BASED FINANCE 9-10 (2004) [hereinafter Udell]. 
 150.  Slee, supra note 146, at 322-23. 
 151.  Id. at 321. 
 152.  Id. at 327. 
 153.  Id. at 330. 
 154.  Id. at 329-30. 
 155.  See supra Section I.B.1. 
SHADAB_FINAL (ARTICLE 3) - HBS EDITS 9-4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/5/2014  11:53 AM 
1112 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 16.4 
 
sensitive contracts are likely to include unique mechanisms for information 
production.156  The two primary monitoring-related aspects of asset-based 
lending are ex ante availability analysis of collateral and ex post monitoring 
and investigation. 
1. Collateral Screening 
Availability analysis is the process by which the asset-based lender 
determines the amount of credit to make available to the borrower after 
analyzing the collateral being offered to secure the loan.157  In valuing the 
collateral, an asset-based lender is concerned with the collectability or 
liquidation value of the collateral as opposed to its market value.158  
Collateral whose value is uncorrelated with the value of the company as a 
whole, and retains its value if the company becomes insolvent, is 
particularly attractive to asset-based lenders. 
In determining the eligibility of assets to be included in the borrowing 
base, the lender will generally seek to exclude any assets that will not result 
in cash payment to the borrower or are difficult to liquidate.159  When 
accounts receivable are used as collateral, the eligibility determination 
turns on an estimate of the extent to which receivables may be 
uncollectable.160  The discount rate will be lower if the lender is less 
concerned with non-collectability (primarily in the form of dilution) and 
collection costs.161  According to Udell, specific factors impacting the 
discount rate include macro and local economic conditions, the credit 
strength of the borrower’s particular accounts, and the borrower’s gross 
profit margin.162  In general, the liquidation value of receivables is close to 
 
 156.  See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 157.  Udell, supra note 149, at 60-61. 
 158.  Berger & Udell, supra note 16, at 313; UPS CAPITAL, GLOBAL ASSET-BASED 
LENDING, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, (2012), 
https://www.upscapital.com/solutions/app_docs/GABL-FAQ.pdf [hereinafter UPS Capital]; 
Practical Law Company, Asset-based Loan Agreement: Borrowing Base Definitions (2013) 
(“Asset-based lenders generally value inventory at below market sale prices when 
determining the amount of the loans that the inventory can support through the borrowing 
base.”), http://us.practicallaw.com/1-502-8687#a542520; Utilizing Contracts as Collateral 
in Asset-Based Lending, ACCUVAL, March 2010 (“When using long–term contracts as 
collateral, their value should be considered as if they were under distress since that would be 
the most relevant value for the lender.”), 
http://www.accuval.net/insights/featuredarticle/detail.php?ID=60. 
 159.  Practical Law Company, supra note 87. 
 160.  See also Slee, supra note 146, at 316-17 (describing the characteristics of 
receivables that may make them ineligible to be included in the borrowing base). 
 161.  Slee, supra note 146, at 317-18. 
 162.  Udell, supra note 149, at 66. 
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their face value and do not substantially diminish in the event of a 
company’s insolvency.163  When inventory is used as collateral, the 
eligibility determination turns on whether the inventory being used as 
collateral is in the borrower’s possession, is owned free and clear of any 
legal encumbrances, and is in a salable condition.164  The discount rate 
applicable to inventory is dependent on the liquidity of the inventory in 
question, and the difficulty of valuing the collateral in general and 
verifying its value over the life of the loan to ensure the loan-to-collateral 
ratio is consistent with the lender’s determination.165 
2. Monitoring Covenants and Collateral 
Monitoring plays a unique role in asset-based lending because of the 
covenants that lenders monitor and the prominence of collateral 
monitoring.  Asset-based lending’s unique emphasis on collateral 
monitoring is reflected in the financial ratios that asset-based lenders 
monitor in contrast to financial statement lenders.  Asset-based lenders 
focus on ratios that evaluate collateral and not a company’s overall 
creditworthiness.  Asset-based lenders focus on ratios such as those 
measuring a company’s decrease in accounts receivable collections 
(dilution) and ratios measuring the quality of its accounts.166  The former 
category includes ratios such as the fraction of returned items sold on 
account.  The latter includes ratios such as the fraction of accounts 
receivable over ninety days past due.  Importantly, asset-based loans 
contain few, if any, financial covenants.167  By contrast, the ratios focused 
on by financial statement lenders include financial covenants typically 
expressed in ratios that measure a company’s liquidity, leverage, and 
profitability.168 
Monitoring plays a unique role in asset-based lending because 
monitoring collateral is particularly intense.  In an asset-based loan, the 
collateral that is ultimately used to determine the size of the line of credit is 
 
 163.  Id. at 72. 
 164.  Udell, supra note 149, at 72; Slee, supra note 146, at 318. 
 165.  Udell, supra note 149, at 73. 
 166.  Id. at 9. 
 167.  David Crumbaugh, Are Asset-Based Loans The New Black?, LATHAM & WATKINS 
(Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/asset-based-loans-middle-market-
deals [hereinafter Crumbaugh] (stating that asset-based loans “are going to be done with 
either no financial covenants or a springing financial covenant that only gets tested when 
borrowing availability falls below a very small percentage of the revolving loan 
commitment”); Kyle Stock, Asset-Based Lending Grows in Popularity, WSJ.COM (Feb. 2, 
2010) [hereinafter Stock]. 
 168.  Stock, supra note 167. 
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known as the borrowing base.  Monitoring takes place by borrowers 
reporting the value of the borrowing base periodically (or whenever new 
funds are requested) in accordance with the agreed upon borrowing base 
formula.  These reports will also typically include the value of the collateral 
underlying the borrowing base.  Asset-based lenders typically monitor the 
collateral closely to make the largest possible loan under the terms of the 
agreement.169  The nature and frequency of borrowing base and collateral 
reports depend on several factors, including the eligible assets, the capacity 
of the lender, and how close the borrower is to the maximum borrowing 
capacity.170  Reports can range from daily to monthly.  In the case of 
monitoring receivables collateral, the lender has daily information 
regarding the status of each of the borrower’s receivables.171  In addition, 
assets with a greater price volatility or turnover are subject to more 
frequent collateral reporting.172  Borrowing base reports are reported using 
a form borrowing base certificate (attached to the loan agreement as an 
exhibit).  Borrowing base reporting may be done by fax, email, or through 
an electronic platform.  Typically, independent nonbank commercial 
lenders are better borrowing base monitors than banks.173 
The following is an example of a typical borrowing base certificate.  It 
provides information to the lender about how much the borrowing base is 
worth and therefore the size of the borrower’s credit line.174 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 169.  Practical Law Company, supra note 87. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Berger & Udell, supra note 16, at 312. 
 172.  Practical Law Company, supra note 87. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Slee, supra note 146, at 317. 
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The value of the borrowing base must be periodically re-determined to 
account for fluctuating values of the eligible assets.  In particular, to 
prevent the size of loan from remaining constant while the value of the 
eligible assets declines, the lender will engage in periodic monitoring 
through appraisals of the assets.175  The appraisals are typically carried out 
by an independent appraiser or engineer.176  And to prevent fraud, the 
lender will also hire a third party to engage in periodic field examinations 
that confirm the accuracy of the lender’s reports about the borrowing 
base.177  The agreement may also permit the lender to make the changes 
without an independent appraisal of how the borrowing base is calculated,; 
nonetheless, the lender must carry out borrowing base redeterminations in 
good faith.178 
 
 175.  Slee, supra note 146, at 317. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Steven M. Rosenberg, What is the Purpose of a Lender’s Field Examination?, 59 
THE SECURED LENDER, July/August 2003, http://www.rosenbergandfecci.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/09/jul03_pg044.pdf; UPS Capital, supra note 158. 
 178.  UPS Capital, supra note 158. 
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C. Performance Sensitivity Through a Borrowing Base 
As discussed in Section I,179 ex ante performance sensitivity includes 
the terms of a loan changing based upon the value of the borrower’s 
collateral.  Asset-based loans are performance sensitive because the amount 
of credit available is based upon the value of its collateral.  The specific 
contractual provision that keeps the size of the loan proportional to the 
value of the collateral is known as the borrowing base. 
1. The Borrowing Base Provision 
A borrowing base is a contract feature that determines the amount of 
credit available to a borrower according to the value of certain assets.  At 
any particular time, the amount of funds available to a borrower under a 
given line of credit depends on the value of the borrower’s borrowing 
base,180 thereby making credit available dependent on the performance of 
the borrowing base, and hence performance sensitive.  The value of a 
borrowing base is determined by the value of assets eligible to be used as 
collateral and a discount rate applied to the borrowing base (the advance 
rate) to provide the lender a cushion for unforeseeable problems and other 
costs.  This discount rate is known as the advance rate and it is the 
percentage of the value of the eligible assets that constitute the size of the 
loan (and any letters of credit).181  Assets perceived to generate more cash, 
or that are easier to liquidate, will receive a higher advance rate.182  For 
example, accounts receivable typically receive a higher advance rate than 
inventory.  The advance rate is typically between 70 and 85 percent for 
accounts receivable and between 50 and 65 percent for inventory.183  The 
advance rate will always be less than 100 percent, meaning that an asset-
based loan will be overcollateralized in the sense of the loan amount being 
 
 179.  See supra Section I.B.3.ii. 
 180.  See Robert. A. Modansky, Asset-Based Financing Basics, J. ACCOUNTANCY, Aug. 
2011 (“As the borrower manufactures or acquires new inventory, and as it generates 
receivables from sales, these new assets become available for inclusion in the borrowing 
base.”), http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2011/aug/20113992; Latham & 
Watkins, Book of Jargon: US Corporate and Bank Finance, Asset-Based Loan, 
http://www.lw.com/bookofjargon-apps/boj-us-corporate-and-bank-finance (defining an 
asset-based loan as “a Revolving Facility where the total amount that can be borrowed 
fluctuates based upon the value of certain assets of the Borrower at a given time”) (emphasis 
added).  
 181.  Practical Law Company, supra note 87. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id.; Slee, supra note 146, at 318-19. The principal owners of an asset-based 
borrower may also offer a personal guarantee or pledge personal assets to support the loan. 
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less than the market value of the borrowing base assets. 
The amount of the loan relative to value of the eligible assets is also 
typically further reduced by the borrower setting aside a reserve.  
Agreements typically give wide discretion to lenders to require reserves.184  
One reason why the borrower may be required to set aside a reserve is 
because of the higher cost of monitoring certain assets.185  The definition of 
the borrowing base is typically heavily negotiated and dependent on the 
particular circumstances of the parties such as relative bargaining power 
and industry norms.186  Although inventory, accounts receivable, and 
equipment are the types of assets traditionally included in an asset-based 
loan’s borrowing base, in principle any type of asset can be included. 
2. Borrowing Base Definitions 
By examining how borrowing base provisions are drafted,187 I have 
identified several different methods by which a borrowing base can 
establish the size of a loan and keep it in proportion to the value of the 
assets.  Performance sensitivity is a function of how relevant contract 
language is drafted. 
A straightforward way is to define a borrowing base is as a percentage 
of eligible assets.  The following are three examples: 
“Borrowing Base means an amount equal to eighty percent (80%) of 
Eligible Accounts, as determined by Lenders with reference to the most 
recent Borrowing Base Certificate delivered by Parent.”188 
“Borrowing Base means, as of any date of calculation, an amount, as 
set forth on the most current Borrowing Base Certificate delivered to the 
Administrative Agent, equal to 85% of Eligible Receivables as of such 
date.”189 
“Borrowing Base: at any time, an amount equal to the sum of (a) 
 
 184.  Slee, supra note 146, at 318-19. 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  See Elizabeth Goldberg, Facing Down Ford, AM. LAWYER, April 2007, 
http://www.weil.com/wgm/cwgmhomep.nsf/Files/DokosDofY/$file/DokosDofY.pdf 
(detailing the process of negotiating the terms of a loan to Ford given by J.P. Morgan, 
Citigroup, and Goldman Sachs). 
 187.  I reviewed a random sample of 100 borrowing base provisions located in publicly 
filed loans on SEC Form 8-K. 
 188.  Careview Commc’ns, Inc., Loan and Security Agreement (Aug. 31, 2011), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1377149/000138713111001976/ex-10_81.htm. 
 189.  Roadrunner Transp. Sys., Inc., Second Amended and Restated Credit Agreement 
(Aug. 31 2011), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1440024/000095012311082711/c22186exv10w10.
htm. 
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eighty-five percent (85%) of all Eligible Accounts Receivable of the 
Borrower and its Subsidiaries, plus (b) sixty percent (60%) of all Eligible 
Inventory of the Borrower and its Subsidiaries, valued in accordance with 
GAAP.”190 
The borrowing base definition may also give the lender or the 
administrative agent significant discretion to reduce the credit available to 
the borrower by reducing the advance rate percentage. For example: 
 
“Borrowing Base” is eighty percent (80.0%) of Eligible Accounts, 
as determined by Bank from Borrower’s most recent Borrowing 
Base Certificate; provided, however, that Bank may decrease the 
foregoing percentage in its good faith business judgment based on 
events, conditions, contingencies, or risks which, as determined 
by Bank, may adversely affect Collateral.191 
 
In addition to reducing the amount of the loan, discretion may also be 
extended to increasing the amount of required reserves or narrowing the 
scope of eligible assets.  For example: 
 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, the 
Administrative Agent may, in its Permitted Discretion, or shall at 
the direction of the Required Lenders in their commercially 
reasonable discretion, at any time hereafter, decrease the advance 
percentage for Qualified Accounts and Qualified Inventory, or 
increase the level of any  reserves or ineligibles, or define or 
maintain such other reserves or ineligibles, as the Administrative 
Agent or Required Lenders, as applicable, may deem necessary 
or appropriate.192 
 
A reduction in loan size is also responsive to ex post monitoring in the 
form of field audits, examinations, and appraisals.193  In some asset-based 
 
 190.  New Enter. Stone & Lime Co., Inc., Second Amended and Restated Credit 
Agreement (Jan. 11, 2008),  
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1527032/000104746911007722/a2204980zex-
10_2.htm. 
 191.  Demandware, Inc., Loan and Security Agreement (July 18, 2008) (emphasis 
removed),  
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1301031/000119312511189260/dex1018.htm. 
 192.  Universal Stainless and Alloy Products., Inc., Credit Agreement (Aug. 18, 2011),  
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/931584/000119312511230804/dex101.htm. 
 193.  See, e.g., New York & Co., Inc., Third Amended and Restated Loan and Security 
Agreement 6 (Aug. 10, 2011), http://yahoo.brand.edgar 
online.com/EFX_dll/EDGARpro.dll?FetchFilingHTML1?ID=8139753&SessionID=-
SHADAB_FINAL (ARTICLE 3) - HBS EDITS 9-4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/5/2014  11:53 AM 
2014] PERFORMANCE SENSITIVE DEBT 1119 
 
loans, failure to furnish a borrowing base certificate will automatically 
cause the loan amount to be reduced to one dollar.194 
D. Asset-Based Lending and Creditor Governance 
Asset-based lending combines several fundamental creditor 
governance devices: strong monitoring, performance pricing,195 lines of 
credit, and collateral-based finance in the form of a borrowing base.  
Combining these governance devices significantly reduces the agency costs 
of debt that arise from informational asymmetries.196  Asset-based lending 
addresses the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard.  For 
example, asset-based lending can prevent borrowers from increasing their 
risk profile after a loan is made (asset substitution): asset-based lenders 
monitor borrower collateral on an ongoing basis and are able to quickly 
intervene to prevent a borrower from engaging in undesired activities, 
especially when the borrower’s financial condition deteriorates and it has a 
greater incentive to increase its risk taking.  Alan and Guar argue that asset-
based lending helps to reduce a lender’s exposure to a borrower’s risk of 
bankruptcy by setting an upper limit on a lender’s potential losses.197  
Consistent with creditor governance devices being substitutes, asset-based 
lenders are generally more willing to accept fewer (or looser) covenants 
and personal guarantees because, compared to typical secured lenders, 
asset-based lenders intensely monitor and overcollateralize their 
exposures,198 and also protect themselves with performance sensitivity.199  
Indeed, asset-based lenders are often willing to make loans with no 
financial covenants at all because they can rely on other governance 
 
XKpFHhUWjxwJX7 (“Agent shall have the right to revise the advance rates in, establish 
Reserves against or sublimits in the Borrowing Base in such amounts and with respect to 
such matters as Agent in its good faith discretion shall deem necessary or appropriate, at all 
times and after Agent has completed its updated field audits, examinations and appraisals of 
the Collateral”). 
 194.  Reg Marketing & Logistics Grp., LLC, Revolving Credit Agreement 5 (April 8, 
2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1463258/000119312511243548/dex1021.htm 
(“[T]he Borrowing Base shall be reduced to one Dollar ($1.00) during any period when the 
Borrowers have failed to furnish any computation of the Borrowing Base required hereby”). 
 195.  Asset-based loans typically have performance pricing provisions. 
 196.  See Udell, supra note 149, at 14-20 (discussing different mechanisms used by 
lenders to reduce their risk in asset-based financing). 
 197.  Yasin Alan & Vishal Gaur, Operational Investment and Capital Structure Under 
Asset Based Lending (Johnson Sch. Research Paper Series, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1716925. 
 198.  Slee, supra note 146, at 315. 
 199.  Id. 
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devices to substitute for such covenants. 
An important outcome of the strong creditor governance devices 
employed in asset-based loans and the tradeoffs they make possible is that 
the loans make credit more widely available and at a lower cost to 
borrowers that otherwise would not qualify for a loan.200  First, because a 
potential borrower may be weak from the standpoint of ratios used to 
determine whether a traditional financial statement loan would be made yet 
nonetheless have particular assets that are strong when viewed as potential 
collateral for an asset-based loan, a borrower that lacks general 
creditworthiness characteristics may nonetheless still be able to obtain an 
asset-based loan due to the quality of its collateral.  For example, a 
company that is highly leveraged may nonetheless be able to obtain an 
asset-based loan if it nonetheless is able to generate substantial cash flows 
through high turnover in its accounts receivables or inventory.  Asset-based 
lenders’ lack of concern about the borrower’s success as an enterprise 
explains why they are willing to make loans to riskier companies.201  Asset-
based lending as a form of intermediation is therefore, in part, a response to 
borrowers’ inability to signal their quality to lenders through traditional 
financial measures. 
Asset-based loans also often have a lower interest rate than 
comparable loans.202  This is in accordance with my claim that creditor 
governance devices are tradeoffs such that strong devices in the form of 
security, monitoring, and performance sensitivity mean that a creditor does 
not need the additional governance device of a high interest rate.  
Furthermore, because an asset-based loan is generally structured as a 
revolving credit facility, it may also reduce a borrower’s interest rate 
because the borrower only pays interest on the amount used and can use 
any unused borrowings to pay down the loan.203  Similarly, asset-based 
loans give borrowers access to cash more quickly than other types of loans.  
In an asset-based loan, cash is made available to the borrower before the 
actual collateral supporting the loan generates cash—for example, before 
receivables are collected or inventory is sold.204  Asset-based lenders are 
 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  See Udell, supra note 149, at 9 (detailing the rationale behind the lending behaviors 
of asset-based lenders). 
 202.  See Schwimmer, supra note 25 (providing background information on the general 
practice of asset-based lending). 
 203.  See GE CAPITAL, GUIDE TO ASSET BASED LENDING 10 (1999), 
http://www.gelending.com/Clg/Resources/PDF/guide/asset_guide.pdf (noting that revolving 
loans are generally more cost-effective in financing relatively short-term projects whereas 
term loans are the same for longer projects). 
 204.  See id. at 10.  Asset-based loans serve the purpose of converting assets to cash 
faster than their usual business cycle.  Id. at 10, 15. 
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willing to advance cash because even at that stage in the loan process they 
will have already benefitted from strong governance in the form of 
screening the collateral and limiting the amount of credit to be less than the 
collateral’s liquidation value. 
IV. ASSET-BASED STARTUP FINANCING 
The prior Sections of this Article suggest that performance-senstive 
loans are generally more efficient in the context of high-risk borrowers, and 
that asset-based loans in particular reduce the agency costs borne by 
lenders due to their unique combination of strong creditor governance 
devices.  Building on those insights, this Section argues that asset-based 
loans have the potential to provide more financing to a particular type of 
high-risk borrower with high agency costs, namely, revenue-stage startups.  
This is because asset-based loans are often cheaper than other sources of 
capital and more borrower-friendly than other types of debt.  In addition, 
because asset-based loans can be structured to meet the needs of a wide 
variety of borrowers, they are likely also able to meet the needs of certain 
high-tech startups with intellectual property assets.  Accordingly, certain 
types of startups may be missing out on an important source of capital. 
A. Background 
1. Startup Financing and Asset-Based Lending 
Startups cannot raise capital as easily as large or established 
companies.  This is in part due to a lack of revenues.  A 2011 survey found 
that 55 percent of eight-year-old startups had annual revenues under 
$100,000, and only 13 percent were over $1 million.205  Startups are also 
generally more risky than larger, more established firms due to their 
relative informational opaqueness and greater incentive to shift risk to 
creditors.206 
Nonetheless, numerous external funding sources are available to 
startups, including various types of equity and debt.207  Startup financing 
generally takes place in several stages.  The earliest stage consists of a pre-
revenue phase where the primary sources of capital come from the founders 
 
 205.  Alicia Robb & Joseph Farhat, An Overview of the Kauffman Firm Survey: Results 
from 2011 Business Activities 4, (June 2013), available at: 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=227764 [hereinafter Robb & Farhat]. 
 206.  Berger & Udell, supra note 16, at 300. 
 207.  Issuing public bonds are a type of financing generally unavailable to startups due to 
their lack of established track records and the costs of underwriting a bond deal. 
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themselves, friends, family, and credit cards.  A second stage is the 
seed/early stage for companies that are earning revenues, and where the 
primary source of funds is from angel investors or specialist funds for less 
than $5 million.  For companies that are (or will likely be) profitable and 
that want to expand, they usually progress to a third stage and obtain 
capital in the $5 million to $10 million range.208  In these stages, startups 
that obtain outside equity overwhelmingly do so from angel investors.209  In 
recent years, angel investors provided about $20 billion to over 60,000 
startups annually with a median deal size ranging from $590,000 to 
$700,000.210  Two additional startup financing stages are the “late stage” 
for consistently profitable companies seeking $10 million or more of 
capital, and a subsequent stage for companies that may be ready for a 
buyout or even an initial public offering of securities.211 
In terms of debt financing, 75 percent of startups obtain external debt 
in the form of business or trade credit, with credit card debt being the 
largest source.212  External debt makes up the largest source of capital for 
startups during their first year.213  Credit lines make up about 15 percent of 
startup capital and term loans constitute another seven percent.214  Most 
loans to startups are small: in any given year, only about 10 percent of 
startup loans are $100,000 or greater in size.215  In 2011, 13.5 percent of 
loans to startups required some form of collateral.216 
For the relatively few startups that receive equity venture capital,217 
 
 208.  MADISON PARK GRP., GUIDE TO VENTURE CAPITAL 3 (detailing the stages of 
venture capital growth), http://madisonparkgrp.com/pdf/gtvc.pdf [hereinafter MADISON 
PARK GRP.] 
 209.  See ACA, Angel Groups, and Angel-Backed Companies, ANGEL CAPITAL ASS’N 16 
(2012) (graphing the comparison of venture capital to angel investors), 
http://www.angelcapitalassociation.org/data/Documents/Resources/ACAandAngelGroupBa
ckground09-12.pdf. 
 210.  See Halo Report Angel Group Update: Q2, SILICON VALLEY BANK 6 (2013) 
(providing information on the average amounts of angel investments), 
http://www.svb.com/uploadedFiles/Content/Blogs/Halo_Report/halo-report-q2-2013.pdf. 
 211.  MADISON PARK GRP., supra note 208 at 3. 
 212.  Rebel Cole & Tatyana Sokolyk, How Do Start-Up Firms Finance Their Assets? 
Evidence from the Kauffman Firm Surveys 38 (Working Paper, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2028176. 
 213.  Alicia M. Robb & David T. Robinson, The Capital Structure Decisions of New 
Firms, REV. FIN. STUD. 14 (2012) (explaining how outside debt is the largest funding source 
for start-ups). 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  Robb & Farhat, supra note 205, at 6. 
 216.  Id. at 5. 
 217.  Diane Mulcahy, Six Myths About Venture Capitalists, HARV. BUS. REV., May 2013 
(“Historically, only a tiny percentage (fewer than 1%) of U.S. companies have raised capital 
from VCs”), http://hbr.org/2013/05/six-myths-about-venture-capitalists/ar/1. 
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one type of loan that is available is venture debt.  Venture debt is a loan 
provided to a company that is already backed by equity venture capital, or 
alongside an infusion of venture capital.218  An estimated two-thirds to 
three-quarters of venture-backed startups use some form of debt;219 and on 
average debt makes up about a third of their capital structure.220  From the 
beginning of 2012 through the first half of 2013, an estimated 450 venture-
backed startups obtained $3.1 billion in venture debt with an average loan 
size of $7.1 million.  During that time, venture debt accounted for just 
under 8 percent of the capital invested in startups.221  Venture debt takes the 
form of a senior secured term loan that has no financial covenants.222  It is 
sold with warrants ranging from five to 15 percent of the loan amount.223  
The interest rate on venture debt varies based on the risk of the borrower 
and other terms of the deal,224 and can range from two to 20 percent above 
the prime rate.225  Venture debt is typically used for growth or as a bridge 
between equity financing rounds.226  In 2012, $26.5 billion of equity 
venture capital financing took place across 3698 deals.227 
In addition to venture debt, asset-based loans can also provide debt 
financing for startups.  When used to fund a startup, an asset-based loan is 
typically available only to companies that are earning revenues, and it is 
collateralized by accounts receivable, inventory, or purchase orders from 
 
 218.  Robb & Farhat, supra note 205, at 3-4. 
 219.  Darian M. Ibrahim, Debt as Venture Capital, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1169, 1177 
(2010) [hereinafter Ibrahim]. 
 220.  Berger & Udell, supra note 16, at 299. 
 221.  NXT Capital Launches Venture Debt Index, BUSINESS WIRE (Nov. 7, 2013), 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20131107005202/en/NXT-Capital-Launches-
Venture-Debt-Index#.U08YNvldX00. 
 222.  LEADER VENTURES, Venture Debt Overview at 5, 
http://leaderventures.com/overview.pdf [hereinafter LEADER VENTURES]. 
 223.  Ibrahim, supra note 219, at 1179. 
 224.  SILICON VALLEY BANK, Venture Debt–Maximizing its Value in The Current 
Environment at 9 (2004), http://www.sandhill.com/conferences/pdf/software04_014.pdf 
[hereinafter Silicon Valley Bank]. 
 225.  See, Raghavan Anand, Is Venture Debt on the Rise?, REUTERS PEHUB (June 3, 
2013) (stating that venture debt “[i]nterest rates are often low, a couple of percentage points 
above prime rate”), www.pehub.com/2013/06/is-venture-debt-on-the-rise/; BESSEMER 
VENTURE PARTNERS,  Venture Debt Analysis, (2009) (noting a 14 percent interest rate for an 
illustrative company’s venture debt), http://www.jasonnazar.com/wp-
content/uploads/2008/11/venture-debt-analysis1.pdf; Ibrahim, supra note 219, at 1182. 
 226.  BRITISH PRIVATE EQUITY AND VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N & WINSTON AND STRAWN, 
The Rise of Venture Debt in Europe at 8 (May 2010), available at http://thebln.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/05/The-Rise-of-Venture-Debt-in-Europe1.pdf. 
 227.  Leena Rao, VCs Invested $26.5B In 3,698 Companies In 2012, Total Dollars And 
Deal Volume Both Down, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 17, 2013), 
http://techcrunch.com/2013/01/17/vcs-invested-26-5b-in-3698-companies-in-2012-total-
dollars-and-deal-volume-both-down/. 
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the startup’s customers.  A typical structure takes the form of a 12-month, 
interest-only revolving line of credit secured by a first priority lien on all 
assets.  The nature and extent of any financial covenants will depend on 
pricing and how much control the lender has over the assets.228 
2. Including Intellectual Property in a Borrowing Base 
For technology (tech) startups, intellectual property (IP) makes up a 
relatively significant portion of their assets.  A survey of startups from 
2004 to 2008 found that 11.2 percent owned patents, 19.5 percent owned 
copyrights, and 22.1 percent owned trademarks.229 
Although uncommon, IP can be used as loan collateral and is a well-
recognized type of legally enforceable security interest.230  Securing a loan 
with IP assets presents unique risks relative to using tangible assets.  These 
risks arise primarily from properly valuing the IP and the complexity of 
providing legal protection and security.231  Valuation challenges arise from 
 
 228.  Silicon Valley Bank, supra note 224, at 10. 
 229.  ALICIA ROBB ET AL., KAUFFMAN FOUND., AN OVERVIEW OF THE KAUFFMAN FIRM 
SURVEY: RESULTS FROM THE 2004–2008 DATA, (2010) 14, 
http://www.kauffman.org/~/media/kauffman_org/research%20reports%20and%20covers/20
10/05/kfs_2010_report.pdf.  For an overview of policy issues regarding patents, see Kirti 
Gupta, The Patent Policy Debate in the High-Tech World: A Literature Review, (Working 
Paper, 2013), available at https://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-
faculty/searlecenter/workingpapers/documents/Gupta_patent-policy-debate-literature-
review.pdf. 
 230.  Maria Loumioti, The Use of Intangible Assets as Loan Collateral (Working Paper), 
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1748675 [hereinafter 
Loumioti] (“I find that twenty-one percent of U.S.-originated secured loans from 1996-
2005” have been collateralized by intangibles); Gaétan de Rassenfosse, How SMEs Exploit 
their Intellectual Property Assets: Evidence from Survey Data, (Intellectual Prop. Research 
Inst. of Austl., Working Paper No. 8/10, ISSN 1447-2317, 2010), available at 
http://www.ipria.net/publications/wp/2010/Working%20Paper%208_2010.pdf (“a survey of 
about 50 European commercial banks found none that routinely accept intangible assets as 
collateral for loans to new technology-based firms”); Anjanette Raymond, Intellectual 
Property as Collateral in Secured Transactions: Collision of Divergent Approaches, 10 
BUS. L. INT’L. 27, 32-33 (2009) [hereinafter Raymond]. 
 231.  Darin Neumyer, Future of Using Intellectual Property and Intangible Assets As 
Collateral, THE SECURED LENDER, Jan/Feb 2008, at 45, available at 
https://cfa.com/eWeb/docs/tsl_archives_pdf/jan08_pg042.pdf [hereinafter Neumyer]; Ian 
Ellis, Maximizing Intellectual Property and Intangible Assets, 4-5 (Athena Alliance, 
Working Paper No. 07, 2009), available at 
http://www.athenaalliance.org/pdf/MaximizingIntellectualPropertyandIntangibleAssets.pdf 
[hereinafter Ellis];  See also  Bruce W. Barton et al., Have IP Assets, Need Money!, The 
Role of IP Valuation in Startup Investment, STOUT, RISIUS, ROSS, 2013, available at 
http://www.srr.com/assets/pdf/role-ip-valuation-startup-investment.pdf (discussing the 
importance of IP assets in securing financing, types of financing, valuation methodologies, 
and why valuation is important). 
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the difficulty of estimating the extent to which the market will accept new 
products and the obsolescence of technology and brands.232  When lenders 
attempt to value IP for the purposes of securing a loan, they are generally 
concerned with the value of the IP under a distressed sale scenario and not 
its value as part of a larger operating company.233  Legal risks include 
ownership challenges (infringement) and the expiration of IP rights.234  In 
addition, there is uncertainty regarding the interaction between how federal 
law and the Uniform Commercial Code govern security interests in 
patents.235 
When IP is used as collateral, it is typically the type of IP that 
generates income from patent or trademark licenses or copyright 
royalties.236  Startups tend to license out a greater portion of their patents 
than more mature firms.237  IP is also typically only valuable to firms for 
obtaining financing after the company is already generating revenues, but 
not before.238 
IP may be used independently to secure a loan or lumped in together 
with the borrower’s other, tangible assets.239  In terms of general structures, 
a lender may have a security interest in the IP or own it outright and lease it 
back to the borrower.240  If the lender has an enforceable security interest in 
 
 232.  Neumyer, supra note 231, at 45. 
 233.  Leveraged IP, IP INVESTOR, Dec. 2006, at 24, available at  
https://files.nyu.edu/djk244/public/12Loans.pdf (“Middle-stage companies . . . usually have 
an IP portfolio that has been proven, and there is more certainty that the IP has value and 
can be sold if the company defaults on the loan.”). 
 234.  Neumyer, supra note 231, at 45.  Other difficulties inherent to using IP as collateral 
include structuring issues, prioritization, registration issues, and not being categorized as 
after-acquired property.  Raymond,  supra note 230, at 45-50. 
 235.  Alicia G. Mills, Perfecting Security Interests in IP: Avoiding the Traps, 128 
BANKING L. J. 746 (2008), available at http://www.dorsey.com/files/Publication/7c9a4920-
e4c6-4011-8811-05313de35e9f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/189f4db8-692e-4223-
a0e1-33785fd8d0f0/mills.pdf. 
 236.  Id. at 9. 
 237.  Gaétan de Rassenfosse, How SMEs Exploit Their Intellectual Property Assets: 
Evidence from Survey Data, (Melbourne Inst., Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 
20/10) available at 
http://melbourneinstitute.com/downloads/working_paper_series/wp2010n20.pdf. 
 238.   See Ronald J. Mann & Thomas W. Sager, Patents, Venture Capital, and Software 
Start-ups, 36 RES. POL. 193, 194, 206 (2007) (introducing author’s quantitative analysis of 
the role of patents for pre-revenue and later-stage startups). 
 239.  Id. at 14-15; Leveraged IP, IP INVESTOR, Dec. 2006, at 24, available at 
https://files.nyu.edu/djk244/public/12Loans.pdf [hereinafter IP INVESTOR] (“This leads to 
the heart of the problem with IP collateral lending: How does one value something with no 
proven value? This conundrum has historically made most lenders wary of this type of 
lending.”). 
 240.  Steven J. Henry, Neil P. Ferraro & Hunter Keeton, Securing a Loan with Patents, 
Trademarks, and Copyrights is Best for Lenders, 6 J. BANK. L., (Jan. 2010). 
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the IP, the lender can typically seize and sell the IP if the borrower defaults 
or otherwise fails in its obligations.241  If the lender owns the asset outright 
through an assignment by the borrower, the lender does not have to be 
concerned with having a legal right to sell the IP upon borrower default.242  
When a security interest is granted in IP that produces a revenue stream, 
the IP asset is pledged as collateral and the loan is paid down by the 
revenue that it generates (as opposed to the revenue generated by the 
company).243 
Although rare, IP may be a primary source of collateral as opposed to 
merely being a secondary, back-up source (a credit enhancer).244  IP assets 
may be used to make longer-term loans if the lender views a new round of 
equity as their primary method of repayment instead of the company’s cash 
flows—a situation likely for certain startups.  In a sale-leaseback structure, 
the lender takes a hands-off approach towards managing the IP and only 
controls it if the borrower defaults.245  An alternative to the sale-leaseback 
structure is for the borrower to keep ownership of the IP but promise (in a 
negative pledge clause) to not pledge the asset to any other creditor.246  
Borrowers are often reluctant to assign away or permit a lender to take a 
lien in their IP.247 
In an asset-based loan, IP can serve the role of a credit enhancer by 
being included in the pool of assets that serve as collateral, even though the 
IP is not part of the borrowing base.248  Another structure that incorporates 
IP with an asset-based loan is a “split” or “bifurcated collateral” 
transaction.  This type of deal consists of an asset-based loan with a first 
lien on assets in the borrowing base combined with a term loan with a first 
lien term loan in the borrower’s IP.249  For example: 
 
 241.  Id. 
 242.  However, owning the IP asset outright may impair its value to the lender, and 
hence undermine its value as collateral, because the lender may be impaired in its ability to 
seek damages for infringement, fail in its responsibility to maintain proper records and fees, 
and other reasons.  Id. 
 243.  Ellis, supra note 231, at 4. 
 244.  IP INVESTOR, supra note 239. 
 245.  Id. at 22-23. 
 246.  Id. at 23. 
 247.  Id. at 23-24. Practitioners claim that using IP as collateral makes the most sense for 
middle stage companies and is significantly riskier for startups.  Id. at 24 (“Middle-stage 
companies . . . usually have an IP portfolio that has been proven, and there is more certainty 
that the IP has value and can be sold if the company defaults on the loan.”). 
 248.  Marie Leon, Collateral Salvage, CFO.COM (June 2, 2005). 
 249.  Done Deal: Junior Capital’s Role in Debt Financing, THE SECURED LENDER, Aug. 
12, 2012, available at 
http://crystalfinco.com/files/3713/4523/4116/August_2012_Roundtable_Discussion_Secure
d_Lender.pdf [hereinafter Done Deal: Junior Capital’s Role in Debt Financing]; Steven 
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[I]n one such transaction, an equity firm purchased an apparel 
company in October 2011 with the intent of restructuring the 
European operations.  The capital structure included a $30 
million revolver secured by inventory and accounts receivables 
and a $12.5 million term loan provided by Crystal [Financial] that 
was secured by a first lien on the intellectual property (in this 
case the brand) . . . [and] on all the non-working capital 
assets . . . .250 
 
In such a structure, the lenders may also each take a second lien 
position in the other lender’s primary collateral.251 
But beyond simply being used as collateral in an ordinary secured 
loan, IP may also be included as part of an asset-based loan’s borrowing 
base.252  When IP is included in a borrowing base, it is valued according to 
the same advance rate methodology as traditional, tangible assets in an 
asset-based loan.253  Including IP in a borrowing base along with more 
traditional assets can increase the amount of credit available to the 
borrower.254  This is typically the case for companies that are at least 
 
Migliero, Recent Trends in Asset-Based Lending — Understanding the History of ABL Can 
Reap Benefits, ABF J. (Sept. 2012), http://www.abfjournal.com/articles/recent-trends-in-
asset-based-lending-understanding-the-history-of-abl-can-reap-benefits/. 
 250.  Steven Migliero, Getting to Yes When Banks Say No - Bifurcated Collateral Loans 
Provide Incremental Liquidity, ABF J., (Sept. 2012), 
http://www.abfjournal.com/articles/getting-to-yes-when-banks-say-no-bifurcated-collateral-
loans-provide-incremental-liquidity/. 
 251.  Id. 
 252.  For considerations in lending against trade names and patents, see Neumyer, supra 
note 231, at 45-47; Gerald Sherman et al., Consumer Brands as Collateral: Opportunities 
for Asset-Based Lenders, COMM. LENDING REV., (Nov.-Dec. 2009), 
http://www.northstarmp.com/pdf/Consumer%20Brands.pdf (looking at the value of 
consumer brands). 
 253.  Neumyer, supra note 231, at 48. 
 254.  Marie Leon, Collateral Salvage, CFO.COM, (June 2, 2005) (“as early as 2001, Levi 
Strauss & Co. . . . directly arranged for $1.05 billion asset-based loan that used ‘a package 
of trademarks’ as well as hard assets”); John R. Hermann, Two Approaches to Financing 
Software at 5, available at 
http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/finish/337/4030.html (“Occasionally, the 
Lender will include some of the value of a borrower’s intellectual property in the borrowing 
base, almost always in connection with a loan that is collateralized by the substantial 
majority of the borrower’s other assets.”); Mario Ippolito et al., Certainty of Execution: 
Asset-Based Lending in Leveraged Finance, 11 ABF J. 2, (May/June 2013), available at 
http://www.paulhastings.com/Resources/Upload/Publications/Certainty_of_Execution_-
_Asset-Based_Lending_in_Leveraged_Finance.pdf. (“The borrowing base collateral . . . 
may . . . include . . . intellectual property.”). 
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somewhat established or if the IP is relatively easy to value.255  Consistent 
with my analysis of monitoring costs and performance sensitivity,256 adding 
IP to the borrowing base has the potential to increase a lender’s profits 
despite having higher monitoring costs.257  Venture lenders and other 
nonbank lenders are much more likely to include IP in a borrowing base 
than banks.258 
B. Why Startups Should Seek Asset-Based Loans 
1. Company-Friendly Financing 
Several aspects of asset-based loans indicate that startups should 
increasingly seek them out.  First, obtaining capital through a loan is often 
better for a startup than equity financing.  Debt is beneficial to startups that 
want to grow without giving up control rights, rights to profits, or suffering 
other aspects of equity dilution that result from selling stock. Taking on 
debt is also beneficial for companies that want to avoid raising equity 
during a down round of financing—when their equity is valued lower than 
what the previous venture capital investors paid.259  Although obtaining 
capital through a loan requires a company to pay a fixed interest rate (and 
other fees), in circumstances often applicable to startups the net cost of a 
loan relative to equity is lower.  For example, a startup that grows 25 
percent over two years may have a higher return (to its current equity 
investors) if it finances that growth with a loan rather than additional 
equity.260  An asset-based loan in particular may be cheaper than raising 
funds with equity.  This is because the revolver structure of asset-based 
loans minimizes the interest payments to such an extent that it is even 
cheaper relative to equity than other forms of debt.261 
For startups that may otherwise obtain venture debt, there are several 
 
 255.  Asset Based Lending, COMMERCIAL FINANCE PARTNERS, 
http://commercialfinancepartners.com/Asset_based_lending.html (“Intellectual property can 
be considered as part of an asset based lending facility, however, only for companies that 
have a proven track history and recognizable brand that has value in itself.”). 
 256.  See Kamphol, supra notes 96 and accompanying text. 
 257. Capturing the Value of Intellectual Property for Leveraged Finance 
Considerations, ACCUVAL, (April 2008), 
http://www.accuval.net/insights/featuredarticle/detail.php?ID=36. 
 258.  Id. at 22-23. 
 259.  LEADER VENTURES, supra note 222, at 4. 
 260.  Jan Haas, The Case For Raising a Venture Debt Round, BOSTON BUS. J., June 12, 
2013, http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/startups/2013/06/venture-debt-nxt-capital-
jan-haas.html?page=all. 
 261.  GE Capital, supra note 203, at 10. 
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reasons why asset-based loans may be a superior type of debt.  First, the 
interest rate on an asset-based loan is typically lower than for a comparable 
venture debt agreement.262  The interest rate is lower because asset-based 
loans have stronger creditor governance than venture debt.  Asset-based 
lenders perform more stringent monitoring than venture lenders and have 
already performed a thorough screen upfront.  In addition, the performance 
sensitivity of asset-based loans due to their use of a borrower base and 
performance pricing makes it less likely that an asset-based loan over-
extends credit to a borrower.  Finally, because asset-based loans are 
structured as a revolving credit facility, they only require the borrower to 
pay interest on capital actually drawn down from the facility.  Repayment 
of loan principal is also more flexible in an asset-based loan.263  When a 
startup has stable revenues, an asset-based loan may also be cheaper than 
venture debt if the borrowing base assets produce predictable cash flows.264  
A lower interest than other forms of debt is crucial, because startups often 
find the requirement to make regular payments to a lender as one of the 
most unappealing aspects of taking on debt in any form. 
Asset-based loans are also cheaper and generally more attractive than 
other types of debt besides venture debt.265  Asset-based loans have less 
stringent covenants and can get capital to borrowers more quickly than 
typical secured loans.266  Asset-based loans typically also do not include 
warrants issued to the lender, which dilute the startup owners’ stake in the 
company.267  The lack of financial covenants and focus on company-level 
performance may also make an asset-based lender more willing to work 
with a company during times of distress.268  And because the amount of 
credit available in an asset-based loan is performance sensitive, it will 
increase as the borrowing base grows, thereby saving the borrower from 
having to obtain a new loan to keep up with its growth.269 
 
 262.  LEADER VENTURES, supra note 222, at 5. 
 263.  Id. at 5. 
 264.  Id. at 6. 
 265.  Slee, supra note 146, at 315; Crumbaugh, supra note 167; The Fundamental 
Benefits of Today’s Asset-Based Finance, Capital Eyes, BANK OF AMERICA (April 2006), 
http://corp.bankofamerica.com/publicpdf/products/abf/0406_FundBenefits_ABL.pdf 
[hereinafter Bank of America]; Schwimmer, supra note 25 (“Many of these issuers that 
historically have obtained less rigorously monitored, or even unsecured, facilities, are 
finding ABL to be cheaper and more flexible.”). 
 266.  See Crumbaugh, supra note 167 and citations therein (explaining execution of 
asset-based loans). 
 267.  Crumbaugh, supra note 167 and citations therein. 
 268.  Asset-Based Lending: A Financing Alternative That Fuels Small Business Growth, 
TAB BANK WHITE PAPER, at 2, available at 
http://go.tabbank.com/rs/tabbank/images/TAB_WhitePaper_ABL.pdf. 
 269.  Financing Alternatives that Support Growth, WELLS FARGO CAPITAL FINANCE, 
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2. Industry Momentum 
Recent years have seen asset-based loans being adapted for a broader 
range of purposes.  This suggests that it can be further adapted to finance 
various types of startups as well.  Traditionally, asset-based lending was 
used by high-risk borrowers for working capital.  These borrowers typically 
included retailers, wholesalers, distributors, and manufacturers because 
these types of firms have assets that can most easily serve as collateral 
suitable for an asset-based loan.270  Over time, however, asset-based 
lending lost its stigma as a type of loan for low quality borrowers271 and 
became used by a wide variety of small and medium enterprises for a 
variety of purposes.272  Currently, asset-based loans are used for a wide 
range of purposes, including: financing working capital and other 
expenditure needs, expansion through transactions such as mergers and 
leveraged buyouts, and stabilizing troubled companies through turnaround 
and debtor-in-posession transactions.273 
Another important dynamic in the asset-based lending industry is 
increasing  competition among lenders.  Increasing competition has 
resulted in asset-based lenders expanding the types of borrowers and 
industries they are willing to lend to.274  For example, since entering the 
asset-based loan business in 2007, most of On Deck Capital’s loans have 
been to companies with revenues of less than $3 million a year.275  
Competition has also made the loans much more flexible and borrower 
friendly.  These include a lower minimum required cushion of value of 
assets over debt outstanding (excess availability), a lower threshold of 
excess availability for triggering financial covenants, greater collateral 
over-advances, and allowing the borrower to pay out dividends.276 
Technology is also reducing the costs associated with monitoring a 
borrowing base.277  For example, CADENCE provides software that 
 
(2011), available at http://wellsfargocapitalfinance.com/docs/growth.pdf. 
 270.  GE Capital, supra note 203, at 10. 
 271.   John B. Caouette et al., Asset-Based Lending and Lease Finance, in MANAGING 
CREDIT RISK: THE GREAT CHALLENGE FOR GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 122 (2011); Tim 
Reason, Borrowing Big Time, CFO.COM, Nov. 1, 2003; Hugh C. Larratt-Smith, Asset-Based 
Lending in Europe Today, THE SECURED LENDER, Sept. 2013, at 16, 19. 
 272.  Crumbaugh, supra note 167 (stating that “[asset-based] loans have gone 
mainstream in the last four or five years and as people find more uses for them they are 
going to continue to increase in popularity”). 
 273.  Bank of America, supra note 265. See also Slee, supra note 146, at 315. 
 274.  Myra A. Thomas, ABL Goes Mainstream, THE SECURED LENDER, Nov. 2013, at 20. 
 275.  Stock, supra note 167. 
 276.  Schwimmer, supra note 25.  These changes have been mitigated to some extent by 
increasing advance rates or increasing the fixed charge ratio.  Id. 
 277.  See Rishi Kumar, The Hitchhiker’s Guide to Technology for the Commercial 
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enables lenders to monitor multiple types of collateral and automatically 
screen assets for eligibility, which it claims speeds up the process from 
several days to several minutes.278  Another company, ABLSoft, provides 
continuous, Web-based collateral monitoring software.279  Ftrans also sells 
an automated collateral monitoring product and explains its benefits as the 
following: 
 
With Ftrans, lenders can adjust advance rates using online 
monitoring of automatically generated, risk-adjusted clients’ 
borrowing bases to decrease exposure and systematically manage 
the key risks of extending working capital loans to smaller 
businesses.  Because acquiring standard loan documentation is 
automated, you can comfortably extend your lending footprint 
and extend credit to smaller businesses at acceptable rates.  Less 
time is spent monitoring the loan and managing the loan 
documents.280 
 
A decrease in the costs and administrative burdens associated with 
monitoring should increase parties’ willingness to use asset-based loans.  
High monitoring costs are a major reason why lenders avoid making asset-
based loans, and the burden of continually reporting loan information is a 
major reason why borrowers find the loans unattractive. 
3. Structural Flexibility 
In addition to being adaptable for various economic purposes 
generally, in recent years, asset-based loan structures have evolved to meet 
the specific circumstances of borrowers.  This structural flexibility suggests 
that asset-based loans can be structured to meet the specific needs of 
various types of startups as well.  These specific needs include financing 
the purchase of equipment and providing working or growth capital. 
In the 1990s, hedge funds began providing capital for asset-based loan 
 
Lender, SECURED LENDER, May 2013, available at 
http://www.nxtbook.com/ygsreprints/CFA/p34301_tsl_may2013/index.php#/26.  Berger & 
Udell, supra note 16, at 319 (noting generally that software and internet-based networking 
have reduced the costs of monitoring accounts receivable collateral). 
 278.  CADENCE For ABL, BAYSIDE BUSINESS SOLUTIONS,  available at 
http://baysidebiz.com/products/cadence-for-abl/. 
 279.  Intelligent Asset-Based Lending Software, ABLSOFT, available at  
http://www.ablsoft.com/documents/brochure4.pdf. 
 280.  Lightly Monitor and Lend With Confidence, FTRANS FINANCIAL TRANSACTION 
SYSTEMS, 2011, available at  
http://www.ftrans.net/ftrans/BankSolutions/CIcollateralmonitoring/tabid/325/Default.aspx. 
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transactions in the form of second lien loans when asset-based lenders 
could not provide the entirety of the capital needs of borrowers.281  In such 
a structure, the asset-based lender takes a senior lien on all of a company’s 
assets while the hedge fund takes a second lien.282  The second lien 
provider does not take any equity and has the same strict covenants as 
ordinary cash-flow loans.283  Borrowers increasingly found second-lien 
loans attractive compared to mezzanine and high-yield debt for numerous 
reasons.284  Second-lien loans were generally priced lower than unsecured 
mezzanine debt, not packaged with equity components that would require 
borrowers to dilute their equity or give up control in their company, and 
 
 281. Steven Migliero, Recent Trends in Asset-Based Lending — Understanding the 
History of ABL Can Reap Benefits, ABF J., Sept. 2012, 
http://www.abfjournal.com/articles/recent-trends-in-asset-based-lending-understanding-the-
history-of-abl-can-reap-benefits/ [hereinafter Migliero].  A second lien loan is a loan that is 
secured by a borrower’s assets but has a subordinate position with respect to the collateral 
relative to the original, first lien secured lender.  George H. Singer, The Lender’s Guide to 
Second-Lien Financing, BANKING L. J. (2008), at 199-201 , 
http://www.lindquist.com/files/Publication/0611cf1d-72f4-4b32-a5ec-
00d521026e0f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/964a8361-687c-47a5-aa66-
0726c43fe20c/The%20Lenders%20Guide%20to%20Second%20Lien%20Financing.pdf; 
Neil Cummings & Kirk A. Davenport, A Primer on Second Lien Term Loan Financings, 
COMMERCIAL LENDING REVIEW, Sept-Oct 2004, available at 
http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub1066_1.pdf. 
 282.  Migliero, supra note 281.  See also How to Finance a Gap (‘Airball’) In An Asset 
Based Loan, SC CREDIT ADVISORS, at 7, 
http://www.stonecarlie.com/content_uploads/HowtoFinanceaGapinanAssetBasedLoan.pdf.  
An important aspect of second-lien lending is the contractual and legal relationship between 
multiple creditors secured by the same collateral.  Second-lien lenders usually must first 
obtain an agreement from first-lien holders to subordinate at least some of their rights in the 
common collateral and common borrower.  The first-lien lender will seek to have its rights 
and remedies against the second-lien lender as free and clear as possible and also control the 
common collateral and the actions of the second-lien lender with respect to the common 
collateral and borrower.  All things being equal, a second-lien lender will seek to preserve 
its own control over the common collateral and borrower and hence its likelihood of being 
repaid in the event of default or bankruptcy.  The agreement between the first-lien and 
second-lien holders is made in an intercreditor (or subordination) agreement that specifies 
the effect of a default or bankruptcy with respect to payment and lien priority.  Intercreditor 
agreements typically do not block payments to second-lien lenders and impose relatively 
short standstill periods post default, after which the second-lien holder can exercise its 
remedies against the borrower or the collateral.  Intercreditor agreements are subject to legal 
uncertainty, however, in part because the jurisprudence surrounding the details of such 
agreements is not highly developed, and unsecured lenders have increasingly been 
attempting to secure their loans with second liens.  Drawbacks of second-lien lending 
relative to mezzanine loans include having more restrictive covenants and potential 
volatility from utilizing floating rates. 
 283.  Migliero, supra note 281. 
 284.  Robert C. Rubino, Why Today’s Borrowers and Lenders are Leaning Towards 
Second Liens,SECURED LENDER, May/June 2004, at 30. 
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were non-amortizing until first-lien loans were paid in full.285  First/second 
lien loan structures constitute about 20 percent of the asset-based loan 
market.286 
A further evolution on the first lien/second lien structure came in the 
mid-2000s in the form of bifurcated deals.  Bifurcated structures involve 
combining an asset-based revolver with a first lien on current assets (such 
as accounts receivable) with a term loan secured by long-term assets and 
the enterprise value of the company.287  This structure is more expensive 
than a pure asset-based loan facility but cheaper than the first lien/second 
lien structure and in the range of seven to eight percent.288  Since the 
financial crisis of 2008, asset-based loan structures have returned with 
bifurcated deals.289  The bifurcated structure is likely one that will continue 
to be used for borrowers that need more capital than provided by an asset-
based revolver alone.290  Bifurcated structures are also cheaper than 
revolving credit lines offered by banks that use a high-yield bond structure 
instead of a term loan.291 
A structural modification that may give comfort to lenders not 
otherwise inclined to make an asset-based loan is taking equity stakes in 
borrowers.  Lenders can take equity positions in the companies to which 
they extend credit through the use of warrants and other so-called equity 
kickers.292  Likewise, purchasing credit insurance allows asset-based 
 
 285.  Merger and acquisition activities among middle market companies also fueled the 
demand for nontraditional financing in the form of second-lien loans.  Cassandra Mott, John 
Mazey & Scott Moore, Middle Market Lending: Traits and Trends, PRACTICAL LAW 
JOURNAL , Nov. 2010, at 63. 
 286.  Migliero, supra note 281. 
 287.  Id. 
 288.  Id. 
 289.  Id. 
 290.  See also Crumbaugh, supra note 167 (explaining that “you are going to find more 
and more deals where certain classes of lenders who can’t do revolvers are going to do a 
cash flow term loan coupled with an [asset-based loan] revolver from an ABL lender with a 
split collateral intercreditor agreement between the two of them.”). 
 291.  Crumbaugh, supra note 167 
 292.  There are four main types of equity kickers.  Warrants are option-like rights 
enabling the holder to purchase the borrower’s stock at a price that is prespecified and, if the 
stock is publicly traded, are typically 15 percent above the current market price when the 
warrants are issued.  The use of warrants gives an incentive for an asset-based lending fund 
to offer asset-based loans at lower prices than traditional asset-based lenders that do not use 
equity kickers because the fund’s interest in the overall health of the borrower mitigates 
their interest in charging a high rate of interest.  A second type of equity kicker is debt that 
is convertible to common stock (convertible debt) and is usually subordinated to senior debt.  
Converting the debt to common stock is an option of the lender; to exercise the option the 
lender will typically have to pay a premium of 20 to 30 percent above the price of the 
common stock when the loan was originally made.  The option is hence more valuable the 
higher the stock has risen since credit was extended and thereby gives an incentive for the 
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lenders to feel more comfort in the loan and potentially extend credit on 
terms they would not have otherwise.293 
4. Asset-Based IP Financing 
Tech startups with IP assets may fail to appreciate the willingness of 
lenders to use IP in an asset-based loan and therefore miss out on an 
important source of capital.  Asset-based loans backed by, or involved 
with, IP are beginning to grow.  IP is increasingly being used to secure 
loans generally.294  In particular, bifurcated asset-based loan structures with 
IP in a (second lien) borrowing base are increasingly common.295  Venture 
lenders are taking a larger role in lending against IP with low or uncertain 
value, as opposed to well-established brands and other assets,296 which 
indicates that asset-based lenders will increasingly do so as well.  Startups 
with IP also have a greater ability to attract equity capital,297 which 
indicates that the value investors find in IP may be financed with debt as 
well.  In addition, startups with patent assets are more likely to use venture 
debt financing,298 which indicates that asset-based loans may be particularly 
 
lender to monitor, control, or work with the borrower in order to enhance the value of the 
company overall.  A third, and perhaps the most straightforward type of equity kicker, is the 
issuance of low-priced common stock to the lender, which allows it to share in any equity 
gains while retaining minimal downside exposure.  Peter K. Nevitt & Frank J. Fabozzi, 
Types of Capital and Debt, in PROJECT FINANCING 59 (7th ed. 2000). 
 293.  Lee Spurrier, Asset-Based Lenders Employ New Tool to Increase Lending Volumes 
While Lowering Risk, SECURED LENDER, June 2013 at 27-28, available at, 
http://www.nxtbook.com/ygsreprints/CFA/TSL_Jun2013/index.php#/38. 
 294.  IP Investor, supra note 239; Loumioti, supra note 230 (“I find that twenty-one 
percent of U.S.-originated secured syndicated loans during 1996-2005 have been 
collateralized by intangibles, with intangible asset collateralization significantly increasing 
over this time period”) (emphasis added). 
 295.  Done Deal: Junior Capital’s Role in Debt Financing, supra note 249, at 12 
(“Sometimes other assets will be added into the second lien borrowing base, including IP, 
which never would have happened years ago.”) (emphasis added); Thomson Media, ABL 
MM Lenders look to IP Collateral for Second Lien Loans, BANK LOAN REPORT, February 
14, 2005, at 20, available at http://www.pullmanbonds.com/BankReport.pdf [hereinafter 
Thomas Media]; Neumyer, supra note 231, at 44 (“As the economy has shifted away from 
manufacturing, there has been an increase in the quantity of IP [asset-based lending] 
transactions.”). 
 296.  IP Investor, supra note 239.  Venture lenders will often purchase the IP assets and 
then lease them back to the borrower. Id. 
 297.  Carolin Häussler, Dietmar Harhoff, & Elisabeth Müller, To Be Financed or Not. . . 
- The Role of Patents for Venture Capital-Financing,(Ctr. for European Econ. Research, 
Discussion Paper No. 09-003, 2012), available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1393725; 
Annamaria Conti, Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, Patents as Signals for Startup 
Financing, 61 J. INDUSTRIAL ECON. 592 (2013). 
 298.  Timo Fischer & Gaetan de Rassenfosse, Venture Debt Financing: Determinants of 
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amenable for financing patents. 
For lenders, a benefit of using IP in a borrowing base is that its value 
is not directly tied to the stock market or broader economic cycles.299  
Second lien asset-based loans backed by IP also offer higher returns and 
thereby attract investors willing to take on higher risks, including hedge 
funds.300  For borrowers, using IP to secure loans can significantly increase 
the amount of credit available.301 
In addition, over time lenders will likely reduce their aversion to IP-
backed loans because they perform no worse than traditional secured 
loans.302  There also is likely more room for IP to be used as collateral 
because practitioner expertise has room to grow. According to attorney 
Daniel Kegan, “[e]ven within the United States, even limited to intra-state 
transactions, securing intellectual property collateral is often forgotten, 
while both securing and collecting intellectual property are often 
misunderstood, and misapplied.”303 
Commercial law scholar Anjanette Raymond makes a similar point, 
stating that: 
 
Perhaps the most significant fact for all . . . practitioners is that 
most lenders do not understand intellectual property at all.  They 
have difficulty understanding its value as collateral, find it hard to 
gauge its worth, and have no idea how to maintain its value when 
used as collateral in a finance device.304 
 
 
the Lending Decision, (TUM School of Management, Working Paper 2012), at 14, available 
at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1909602.  But see Paroma Sanyal & Catherine L. Mann, The 
Financial Structure of Startup Firms: The Role of Assets, Information, and Entrepreneur 
Characteristics, (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Working Paper No. 10-17, at 19, 
available at http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/55565/1/642984506.pdf (“[S]tartups 
with intellectual property are more likely to use external debt compared to the owners’ 
personal resources. For hi-tech startups, patents may signal a future revenue stream that can 
help to secure external loans”). 
 299.  Thomson Media, supra note 295. 
 300.  Id. 
 301.  Loumioti, supra note 230. 
 302.  Id. 
 303.  Daniel Kegan, Securing and Collecting Intellectual Property Collateral, 52 
COMM., BANKING & BANKRUPTCY LAW, Dec. 2007, available at  
http://www.keganlaw.com/keganlaw-elan/Clipper_files/16-Securing%20IP-
IsbaCbbDec07%E2%88%9A.pdf. 
 304.  Anjanette H. Raymond, The Use of Intellectual Property as Collateral in Secured 
Financings: Practical Concerns, 32 COMPARATIVE LAW YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS, 2010, at 1-2, available at  
https://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/1221/RAYMONDTheUse2010
FINAL.pdf?sequence=2. 
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Better IP valuation methods, the growth of nonbank lenders that 
specialize in lending against IP (and other nontraditional collateral), and the 
market’s growing comfort with using IP to secure loans305 all indicate that 
there exist overlooked opportunities for startups that own IP. 
5. The Role of Hedge Funds 
Over the past decade, hedge funds and other non-bank asset-based 
lenders have grown to meet borrowers’ demand for capital.  The growth of 
non-bank lenders like hedge funds is significant because it is these lenders 
that will likely be the ones to make loans to startups, either alone or as part 
of a broader loan syndicate.  Compared to hedge funds, traditional banks 
tend to be more conservative, lack the capacity for intense collateral 
monitoring, and require compliance with financial ratios that startups 
typically cannot meet.  By contrast, hedge funds and other non-bank 
lenders have a higher tolerance for risk and are not subject to the same 
regulatory constraints as banks.306  Indeed, the financial crisis led to a long-
term reduction in the credit available from banks due to banks adopting 
higher lending standards and being subject to more strict capital 
regulation.307 
Shortly after the turn of the century, hedge funds began to steadily 
increase their loan origination activities and did so through asset-based 
lending.  According to HedgeFund.net, the total amount of assets managed 
by asset-based lending hedge funds grew rapidly, from under $1 billion in 
2003 to $16 billion in 2008.308  Hedge funds may make direct asset-based 
loans to borrowers as a borrower’s primary lender or play a role in a first 
lien/second lien or bifurcated structure.  Asset-based lending funds have 
enabled tradtional asset-based lenders to make larger loans and the overall 
asset-based industry to grow.309 
Two unique aspects of asset-based lending hedge funds indicate that 
 
 305.  Thomson Media, supra note 295. 
 306.  See Kenneth H. Marks, Four Places to Find Capital, FINANCIAL PLANNING ASS’N., 
May/June 2010, http://www.myarticlearchive.com/articles/10/026.htm; Eden, supra note 16 
(discussing the importance of asset based lenders in the current marketplace); Slee, supra 
note 146, at 315 (“Since [asset-based lenders] are not regulated, they have more autonomy 
to structure deals.”). 
 307.  See Mark V. Nuccio & Richard R. Loewy, Basel III: Impact on Asset-Based 
Lending, ROPES & GRAY, Jan./Feb. 2013. 
 308. Peter Laurelli, Strategy Focus Report: Asset Based Lending Funds, April 1, 
HEDGEFUND.NET, Apr. 1, 2009, available at 
http://www.herrick.com/siteFiles/News/ED7DE95AD77C1B98BDD5097B225845B2.pdf. 
 309.  See Strek, infra note 316 (discussing the importance of the flexible nature of hedge 
funds in growing the financing market). 
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growth in the funds create new opportunities for startups to receive more 
asset-based loans.  First, asset-based lending funds are generally willing to 
accept a wider range of collateral against which to extend credit.  
Traditional asset-based lenders typically secure their loans using accounts 
receivable, inventory, and equipment or other fixed assets.  Asset-based 
lending funds, by contrast, are more willing to use nontraditional forms of 
collateral in a borrowing base,310 including franchise loans, real estate, life 
insurance, energy receivables, litigation receivables, municipal receivables, 
film-related income and distribution rights, education assets, and medical 
equipment.311  For example, an owner of workers compensation receivables 
was able to use the receivables to secure a loan from an asset-based lending 
fund, whereas traditional asset-based lenders were not willing to advance 
funds against such assets.312  In 2011, a maker of augmented reality glasses 
used its 47 patents as collateral for a $500,000 loan from a hedge fund.313 
Consistent with asset-based lending funds’ acceptance of a wider 
range of collateral is a study that hedge fund lenders generally make loans 
to companies having lower profitability, lower creditworthiness, and higher 
asymmetric information than companies that raise debt from bank loans.314  
Hedge funds are also more willing than banks to make loans to smaller 
companies, such as those with less than $50 million in income.315 
Second, asset-based lending funds are more likely to use a wider and 
more borrower-friendly range of structures in their asset-based lending 
transactions.  Fast-growing startups, for example, may prefer an interest-
only, back-ended loan in which the principal is not owed until maturity, 
and asset-based lending hedge funds are more likely to make such loans 
 
 310.  Warren H. Feder, Hedge Funds Fill the Void with a Flexible, Non-Traditional 
Approach, 3 ABF J., July-Aug. 2005 [hereinafter Feder] (discussing the flexible nature of 
hedge funds). 
 311.  See id. (showing specific examples of non-traditional collateral); Chris O’Leary, 
Asset-based Lending Funds Seize on Demand for Credit, INST’L INVESTOR, Oct. 29, 2009, 
available at 
http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/Popups/PrintArticle.aspx?ArticleID=2327050 
(discussing how asset-based lending funds have filled voids in the lending market and 
profited as a result). 
 312.  Feder, supra note 310.  This is in part due to the fact that traditional asset-based 
lenders are more likely to have restrictions limiting their eligible accounts receivable to 
those that extend up to 120 or 150 days, whereas hedge funds do not.  Id. 
 313.  Dugan, supra note 19. 
 314.  Vikas Agarwal & Costanza Meneghetti, The Role of Hedge Funds as Primary 
Lenders, REV. DERIVATIVES RES. (forthcoming), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1596830. 
 315.  Nick Mann, The Revival of Asset-Based Lending, BRIGHTON ASSOCIATES (May 31, 
2012), http://www.brightonhouseassociates.com/web/the-revival-of-asset-based-lending/ 
(discussing changes in financial markets that have led to different targeted investments by 
hedge funds). 
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available.  In addition, asset-based lending funds are more willing to make 
second-lien loans than are traditional asset-based lenders.316 
The use of second-lien loans was historically a very limited type of 
financing utilized by companies to provide temporary (bridge) capital or 
pay down existing debt in restructuring and “rescue financing” situations.317  
Beginning in 2003, however, the second-lien loan market was transformed, 
primarily by asset-based lending hedge funds, to be used for more general 
financing needs and across a variety of transactions.  The amount of 
second-lien loans outstanding surged from $630 million in 2002 to over 
$28 billion in 2006.318  Data by Credit Suisse Group found that hedge funds 
in 2006 purchased approximately 60 to 80 percent of second-lien loans.319  
Importantly, asset-based lending funds are also often particularly interested 
in second liens secured with collateral in the form of intellectual property 
because of its higher yield.320 
 
 316.  Hedge fund lenders found second-lien loans attractive because they gave their 
holders high yields relative to first-lien financing, the ability to recover against collateral, 
and protective rights in bankruptcy liquidation and restructuring situations.  Second-lien 
loans are also a type of investment that provides investors with the attractive features of 
asset-based lending fund investing: equity-like returns with the risk-mitigating benefits of 
lending against collateral, having operational controls, and protections through covenants 
and other contractual provisions.  See John O. Strek, Hedge Funds Provide Liquidity to 
Healthy, Distressed Markets Primary Fund Source in Second-Lien Market, J. CORP. 
RENEWAL (Dec. 2005) [hereinafter Strek] (discussing the extra protections that hedge funds 
can obtain in asset-based lending), 
http://www.turnaround.org/Publications/Articles.aspx?objectID=5437.  When asset-based 
lending hedge funds extend second-lien loans, they typically do not actively monitor 
collateral as intensively as traditional first-lien asset-based lenders, and instead rely on the 
senior secured lender to do so.  In this respect asset-based loan funds may be free-riding on 
the monitoring efforts of first-lien lenders, thereby constituting secondary members of 
information-sharing coalitions, as conceptualized by Leland and Pyle.  See Hayne E. Leland 
& David H. Pyle, Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial 
Intermediation, 32 J. FIN. 371, 371-72 (1977) (discussing the role of asymmetric 
information signaling in providing secondary market participants the information to invest).  
In addition, as second lien lenders and nonprimary monitors,  asset-based lending funds are 
acting consistent with Park’s theory that postulates that senior (first liens) are the efficient 
monitors.  See Park, supra note 37. 
 317.  See George H. Singer, The Lender’s Guide to Second-Lien Financing, BANKING 
LAW J., March  2008, at 199, 200-01 (discussing the traditional applications of second-lien 
lenders). 
 318.  Thomas C. Carlson, Rights Offerings Provide “New” Solution to Classic Leverage 
Problem, J. CORP. RENEWAL, June 2007. 
 319.  Harris Rubinroit, Georgia-Pacific Takeover Sets Record Year for Second-Lien 
Loans, BLOOMBERG , Nov. 13, 2006. 
 320.  Thomson Media, supra note 295 (discussing the use of IP as collateral in loans). 
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C. Limitations and Asset-Based Lender Opportunism 
Despite the potential benefits of asset-based loans to borrowers, the 
loans may directly or indirectly result in creditor opportunism in three 
ways.  First, asset-based loans are structured so as to be overcollateralized 
since the loan is always less than the value of the asset.  This means that 
asset-based lenders are generally less concerned about the overall health of 
the company than a typical financial statement lender.  Indeed, by lending 
against assets for less than they are worth if sold, an asset-based lender 
seeking earlier repayment of their loan would rather have the debtor default 
on their loans so they can seize and sell the assets in a liquidation.  Other 
characteristics of asset-based loans that may make default attractive to a 
lender is that lenders may earn fees upon a covenant breach and borrowers 
may have to pay an early-payment fee.321  Because of the 
overcollateralization and fees, asset-based lenders may be less willing than 
financial statement lenders to renegotiate a loan if there is a covenant 
breach.  These incentives may be exacerbated by a perverse incentive 
created by asset-based loans.  A borrower that is desperate for cash may 
seek to increase the size of its credit line by accumulating inventory (or 
otherwise growing its borrowing base) instead of actually earning cash 
from its customers.322 
Second, the specific ways in which borrowing base provisions are 
drafted may enable lenders to engage in opportunistic conduct.  Contracts 
that give lenders too much discretion to value the assets in a borrowing 
base, or what assets are eligible in the first place, give lenders an incentive 
to “low ball” the valuation to help assure themselves of repayment later.  
Third parties that perform valuation services may also be paid or otherwise 
captured by lenders, and therefore have a bias towards the lenders’ 
interests.  In addition, a borrowing base provision that permits lenders to 
unilaterally decrease the amount of credit available by decreasing the 
advance rate or increasing reserve requirements323 may effectively allow 
the lender to foreclose on the loan by cutting needed working capital from 
the borrower — even though the borrower is in perfect financial health. 
 
 321.  See Dugan, supra note 19 (discussing ways in which hedge fund asset-based 
lenders are filling a demand for loans stemming from a lack of traditional financing 
sources). 
 322.  Ted Hurlbut, The Dangers of Asset Based Loans for Small and Independent 
Retailers, HURLBUT & ASSOCIATES, Feb. 3, 2009, http://www.hurlbutassociates.com/retail-
perspectives-blog/bid/50787/The-Dangers-of-Asset-Based-Loans-For-Small-and-
Independent-Retailers (discussing pitfalls for retailers when using asset-based loans). 
 323.  See generally Universal Stainless and Alloy Products, Inc. Credit Agreement, 
supra note 192 (showing an example of an asset-based deal putting in such conditions). 
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Third, distressed borrowers may be particularly vulnerable to creditor 
opportunism.  In general, when a company is in distress, its assets may be 
more valuable than its broad enterprise value.  This discrepancy gives 
lenders an incentive to sell a company’s loans at a discount to buyers that 
are more interested in owning the collateral than investing in the 
company.324  Moreover, to the extent second lien loans are used as part of 
or to enable an asset-based loan package, they may facilitate certain types 
of creditor opportunism both before and during the bankruptcy process.  
One type of opportunism is known as a “loan to own” strategy which 
consists of a lender providing financing to a troubled firm at a high interest 
rate to increase the probability of default and then exchange the debt 
positions for equity in a restructuring, thereby gaining ownership of the 
firm.325  In particular, providing second lien loans may afford a hedge fund 
an opportunity to ultimately control a struggling firm. According to Strek, 
 
the second-lien market has also become a method for hedge funds 
to gain control of companies that default on their financings.  
Some of these loans may have an equity conversion feature in an 
instance of financial distress.  Hedge funds are very comfortable 
becoming owners of companies through such “loan-to-own” 
strategies.  The basic strategy is for a hedge fund to provide 
financing to a struggling company at attractive rates for the fund.  
If the company cannot subsequently service the debt obligations, 
the fund converts its debt position into a significant/majority 
equity position.326 
 
In addition, when a borrower does go into bankruptcy, the presence of 
second lien lenders may create impediments to reorganization by limiting 
assets to secure financing in bankruptcy and general reorganization 
 
 324.  Eric Uhlfelder, Asset-Based Lending Shifts to Owning, INST’L INVESTOR, July 2010, 
http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/Popups/PrintArticle.aspx?ArticleID=2628221 
(reporting that “instead of originating [asset-based] loans, the fund could do better buying 
secondary loans at deep discounts from distressed owners . . . [because] income streams 
could be unleashed once the assets were divorced from the troubled institutions”). 
 325.  See Michelle M. Harner, Activist Distressed Debtholders, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 
155, 164-170 (2011) (discussing loan-to-own strategies); Adam Pincus, Shining a Light on 
Loan-to-Own, THE REAL DEAL (April 1, 2009), 
http://therealdeal.com/issues_articles/shining-a-light-on-loan-to-own/ (discussing the 
increased risks of loan-to-own); Danielle Fugazy, Lender Rebirth?, MERGERS & 
ACQUISITIONS, April 9, 2009, http://www.themiddlemarket.com/maj/2009_5/-192060-1.html 
(loan-to-own “opportunities involve buying debt of distressed companies, and then 
swapping those positions for equity in the restructured entity.”). 
 326.  Strek, supra note 316. 
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options.327  Hedge funds in particular may disrupt the reorganization 
process by causing collective action problems or having conflicts of 
interest with the debtor or other creditors.328 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has shown that performance sensitivity is an important 
and unique characteristic of financial contracts.  Commercial loans in 
particular can be performance sensitive in several ways.  This Article 
focuses on performance pricing, borrowing base provisions, and 
renegotiation as the most important mechanisms of performance sensitive 
loans.  Performance sensitivity is a type of creditor governance mechanism 
that protects creditors against losses resulting from the agency costs of 
debt.  Performance sensitivity is also related to traditional governance 
mechanisms in the form of monitoring, collateralization, and covenants.  
As predicted by incomplete contracting theory, performance sensitive debt 
is generally more efficient than debt that lacks any responsiveness to a 
borrower’s creditworthiness.  In addition, performance sensitive debt helps 
to flesh out existing theories and empirical findings of corporate capital 
structure.  Focusing on performance sensitivity as a separate governance 
mechanism may also increase the efficiency of corporate credit markets by 
causing practitioners to implement better or new types of performance 
sensitive provisions.  My analysis suggests that increased performance 
sensitivity has the potential to improve markets for financial instruments 
that typically are not performance sensitive, such as bonds. 
Asset-based lending in particular is an important and underappreciated 
type of performance sensitive debt.  Asset-based loans adjust the credit 
available to a borrower using the unique borrowing base provision.  The 
loans are often the only type available for high risk borrowers, and 
therefore employ robust governance in the form of strong monitoring, 
collateralization, and two forms of performance sensitivity (performance 
pricing and borrowing base revolvers).  Because asset-based loans can be 
structured to meet the needs of a wide variety of borrowers, they likely can 
be expanded to provide financing to certain startups.  The types of startups 
most likely to benefit from asset-based loans are revenue-stage angel-
backed or venture-backed startups that have qualifying assets and are 
 
 327.  See generally Gordon L. Su, Bankruptcy Implications of Second Lien Loans 
(Working Paper), http://www.turnaround.org/cmaextras/Paper—
BankruptcyImplications.pdf (discussing the impact on bankruptcy recoveries caused by 
second-lien loans). 
 328.  See id. at 21-25 (discussing the interference second-lien holders create in 
bankruptcy proceedings). 
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seeking financing for growth or working capital. Asset-based lending has 
grown and evolved in the last few decades and will likely continue to do so 
and become a more mainstream financing option.   
Despite its general efficiency and ability to make credit available to 
borrowers with nowhere else to turn, asset-based lending is not immune 
from problems of creditor opportunism.  Indeed, because asset-based loans 
are overcollateralized, they may give lenders too much discretion and are 
often made to distressed borrowers.  The loans may present lenders with 
unique forms of opportunism and weak incentives to work with borrowers 
to restructure loans.  While certain startups are likely to benefit from 
making greater use of asset-based loans, failure to take into account the 
loans’ potential dangers and incentive misalignments may put the 
borrower’s enterprise in jeopardy. 
 
 
 
 
